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I. INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT 
Plaintiff-appellant David Bennett seeks from the Supreme Court declaration of a 
right to trial on the substantive merits of his lawsuit before a Utah judge and jury. 
After enduring over seven years of procedural delays calculated to derail, now on a 
preliminary motion to dismiss in this Court - - without an Answer or permitted discovery, 
but which has included overruled defensive maneuvers in California that were finally 
held wrongfully disruptive of federal-state relationships - - the appellee lawyer 
defendants herein try finally to close the door on any judicial redress. 
Documentation for this Introductory Statement and a summary Statement of Key 
Background Facts are taken from the Record by direct quotation and transcription. Facts 
common to all plaintiffs causes of action are set forth in detail in David Bennett's Fourth 
Amended Complaint, fflf 11-112, R. 1043-1138. 
At its core, David Bennett asserts serious malpractice by the defendant lawyers 
during the course of handling an underlying derivative and class action lawsuit filed in 
1989 as Bennett v. Gen-Probe, et al. later renamed Bennett, et al. v. Bologna, et al As 
that case was being settled in 1992, exerting pressure on clients, the lawyers did not 
properly withdraw from representation of their clients. Instead the defendant lawyers 
personally attacked their client David Bennett in court as a dissenter, which accelerated 
and redounded to the defendant lawyers' own financial interests by over $1.7 million, 
exclusive of handsomely reimbursed expenses. R. 1096. With disgust, David Bennett 
"opted out" of the class action he had initiated, taking nothing. 
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On July 5,1994, the defendant lawyers sought to shield themselves from any 
judicial review in Utah obtaining what came to be designated a "permanent'' "criminal" 
"bar order" in California imposed upon David Bennett - - until overruled by the U,S. 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Bennett, et al v. Gen-Probe, Inc.. et al [Gen-Probe 
II], H6 F.3d 482 (9th Cir. 1997). This improper injunction was imposed out-of-state by 
federal Magistrate Louisa Porter, despite the protested absence of in personam and 
subject matter jurisdiction or case law authority. A "bar order" is not recognized by 
federal procedural rules; was served without prior notice; without posting a bond [a 
general requirement of FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, Rule 65]; was explicitly 
forbidden by judicial powers granted to a magistrate [28 U.S.C. §636(b)(l)(A)]; and was 
violative of the First Amendment of the U.S. CONSTITUTION and Article 1, §§ 1 and 11 of 
the UTAH CONSTITUTION (prior restraint of speech and of access to court). 
A final segment of allegations in David Bennett's Fourth Amended Complaint 
pleaded continuing obstruction and interference by defendant lawyers, who induced a 
California federal judge [Judith Keep] to mandate that portions of his case be stricken and 
that a Utah judge [Tyrone Medley] follow her directions ordered for his court. Judge 
Keep's bar order was first affirmed but narrowed in construction in Bennett et al v. 
Gen-Probe, Inc. et al [Gen-Probe I], 87 F.3d 1317 (9th Cir. 1996), and ultimately 
reversed by the Ninth Circuit. Gen-Probe II. 
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II. KEY BACKGROUND FACTS 
Allegations by appellant taken directly from Bennett v. Jones, Waldo, et al. 
appearing in the Record: 
(1) On December 5, 1989, David D. Bennett caused a verified complaint to be 
filed against Gen-Probe, Inc. its directors and officers in the United States 
District Court for the District of Utah. He was represented in this action by 
his father Wallace R. Bennett, a licensed Utah attorney. The suit included 
injunctive and derivative claims asserted on behalf of Gen-Probe, and class 
claims asserted on behalf of a class including David Bennett and other 
persons who were minority stockholders of Gen-Probe on the date of a 
Chugai take-over agreement, that is: October 27, 1989 (the "Plaintiff 
Class"). 
4th Amended Complaint (Jones Waldo), \ 30: R. 1050. 
(2) The "derivative claims" referred to above were claims against the 
individual directors of Gen-Probe. As a minority stockholder of Gen-
Probe, David Bennett was entitled to bring derivative claims on behalf of 
the corporation against its individual directors, for the ultimate benefit of 
the stockholders of Gen-Probe who would otherwise be deprived of the full 
intrinsic value of their shares in the freeze-out merger. The derivative 
claims were claims which Gen-Probe, Inc. had, and should have brought 
against its own officers, directors and controlling persons, but which the 
corporation would not assert because it was controlled by the very persons 
against whom the claims should have been brought. 
4th Amend Compl. (Jones Waldo), % 31: R. 1050-1051. 
(3) The Complaint also set forth direct federal securities law claims against 
Gen-Probe, Inc., and its directors seeking damages for material 
misstatements and omissions, including failure to disclose that an 
internationally revolutionary pioneering genetic engineering patent had just 
been awarded by the U.S. Patent Office to the executive scientist of Gen-
Probe, Dr. David Kohne. 
4th Amend. Compl (Jones Waldo), \ 33: R. 1051. 
(4) [T]he Gen-Probe Complaint sought compensatory money damages as stated 
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in the Third Amended Complaint filed by Jones Waldo lawyers and 
Wallace Bennett as on May 10, 1990 in an amount of $200 million and for 
punitive damages of $25 million. 
4th Amend. Compl. (Jones Waldo) fl 35: R. 1051. 
(5) In an in-house analysis shared with client David Bennett, Jones Waldo 
predicted a "Verdict range" between "50 million and $100 million".1 See Attachment 
"20". Memorandum to the Litigation Committee from Sidney G. Baucom, dated January 
22, 1990, appended in full herewith. 
Refer to 4th Amend. Compl (Jones Waldo), f 40: R. 1053. 
(6) The Original Putative Class on behalf of whom the Gen-Probe Third 
Amended Complaint was filed included: 
all holders of the common voting stock of Gen-Probe as constituted on 
October 27, 1989, the day before the directors approved a Merger 
Agreement between Gen-Probe and Chugai, excluding from said class all 
of the named defendants, and seeking to exclude the defendants from 
any recovery thereunder. 
4th Amend. Compl (Jones Waldo) \ 36: R. 1051-1052. [Bolded for emphasis]. 
(7) Before any lawsuit was filed against Gen-Probe, Inc., et al., Jones Waldo, 
through defendant Baucom, a member of the firm, provided advice and 
printing assistance to David Bennett and his attorney Wallace Bennett. For 
these services compensation would have been paid had not a superseding 
Retainer Agreement been executed. In relation to these services, the Jones 
Waldo law firm opened an account in David Bennett's name alone (Client 
#1163). The firm recorded over 200 hours of time attributable to the David 
Bennett account between November 21, 1989 and April 18, 1990. On April 
1
 The Gen-Probe case ultimately settled effective November 30, 1993 for a total 
of $6.5 million, which, after deducting well over $2 million in attorneys' fees and costs, 
returned $0.83 a share to remaining minority shareholders. R. 1096. 
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18th, a formal Retainer Agreement was first signed by David Bennett, and 
thereafter by eight other family and friends who became named plaintiff 
clients of the firm. 
4th Amend, Comply f38 (R. 1052), and Exhibit " 1 " (Retainer Agreement; R. 1101-1110), 
appended thereto; see also Attachment "3", Brief of Appellant David D. Bennett (Also 
hereinafter referred to as "Appellant's Brief). 
(8) On April 18, 1990, appellant David D. Bennett signed a Retainer 
Agreement prepared by the law firm of Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough to 
represent David Bennett in a derivative and class lawsuit against Gen-Probe, Inc., and its 
directors. Refer, 4th Amend Compl (Jones Waldo) U 43 and ^ 47, R. 1053 and 1054; 
and Exhibit " 1 " of that Complaint, R. 1110-1111. David alone conceived and brought 
this derivative and class action as the sole plaintiff spokesperson. R. 1053. At the behest 
of Jones Waldo he convinced eight family and close friends to become named clients. R. 
1053. 
(9) Effective October 24,1990, the California law firm of Post, Kirby, Noonan 
& Sweat, through partner Michael L. Kirby, undertook "to become co-counsel of record" 
in the case. Refer, 4th Amend. Compl. ^ 54: R. 1056.2 
(10) The Retainer Agreement provided that the Jones Waldo law firm was to 
"prosecute the lawsuit on behalf of clients against the defendants named" [If 1]; "to pay 
2
 Negotiations for the joint venture were concluded between Post Kirby and 
Jones Waldo lawyers in Salt Lake City, Utah on October 17, 1990. Attach. "14", 
Appellant's Brief. (R. 1599). 
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all costs" [f 3]; that "the Lawsuit shall be prosecuted as a shareholder derivative suit and 
not as a class action." flf 14]; that "no settlement of Clients' causes of action shall be 
binding without consent of Clients and Law Firm" flf 13]; that "Law firm and Clients 
agree that the Third Judicial District Court of Utah shall have jurisdiction and venue" .... 
[If 19]; and that "[a]ny modification of the Retainer Agreement...shall be binding only if 
in writing signed by each party or by an authorized representative of each party." [% 21]. 
Refer, 4thAmend. CompL, Exhibit " 1 " , R. 1101-1110; Appellant's Brief, Attach. "3". 
(11) California attorney Michael Kirby represented to Jones Waldo lawyers that 
he would not commit under any circumstances "to (1) dismiss the derivative claims and 
(2) dismiss the Utah pendent law claims." See appended hereto, Attachment "21" . a 
letter from Michael L. Kirby to Timothy C. Houpt., Esq., December 20, 1990. R. 1059 
(4th Amend. CompL, ffif 67-68); see also R. 82-87 (Amended Complaint (Jones Waldo), 
Wi17-35). 
(12) Lead client David Bennett (with a Masters degree in Cellular, Viral and 
Molecular Biology and Merit Scholar in Finance) uniquely contributed, as no other, in 
preparation of proposed witness testimony, in coordination among other clients, in 
explaining genetic principles involved to the law firm, in making arrangements for 
genetics experts whom he knew to testify, and in recommending independent valuation 
appraisers. R. 1048-1050 (4th Amend. CompL, ffi[ 23, 24, 26, 27,28 and 29.); see also R. 
76-156 (Amended Complaint, particularly fflj 69 to 79). 
(13) Notwithstanding the extraordinary extent of client cooperation and support, 
6 January 14, 2002 (2:33pm) 
major disagreements developed between clients and their lawyers. Derivative and 
insider-trading claims were negligently eliminated, and the one indispensable defendant, 
Gen-Probe, Inc., was incompetently dropped from the litigation and never re-served. [The 
title of the case was permanently changed from Bennett v. Gen-Probe et al. to Bennett et 
al v.Bologna etal. R. 1056-1059 {4th Amend. Compl, fflf 57-62 and 63-68). 
(14) Effective August 8,1991, Wallace Bennett terminated his association as an 
attorney on the case. With court approval he formally withdrew on the record as an 
associated counsel. He charged no further time or expenses to the case. 
(15) In disgust, Appellant David Bennett opted out of the Gen-Probe class 
action lawsuit he conceived while still a law student also working and publishing articles 
on his viral oncology research at the Veterans Administration Medical Center. R. 1068 
(4th Amend Comp. ffif 102-103). Presiding Judge Earl B. Gilliam recognized on 
September 10,1992 that David Bennett was "not bound" by any judgment therein; he 
"had submitted a valid request for exclusion." David took nothing from his lawsuit. R. 
1070 (4th Amend Compl \ 112); Appellant's Brief, Attach. "13". 
(16) Defendant lawyers induced Magistrate Louisa Porter to issue a "Temporary 
Bar Order" against David Bennett. On July 5, 1994, David Bennett was enjoined in the 
names of his family members and close friends under the following lawyer-drafted, self-
serving edict: 
from filing or maintaining any action against class counsel-Jones, Waldo, 
Holbrook & McDonough and it's [sic] attorneys (including Christopher L. 
Burton and Sidney G. Baucom) or any other class counsel - prior to 
7 January 14, 2002 (233pm) 
counsel's motion for a permanent bar order which in any way involves: 
a. The sufficiency or fairness of the class action settlement in the 
above-entitled action; 
b. The competency of class counsel and counsel's legal services on 
behalf of the class in the above-entitled action; 
c. The award of fees and costs to class counsel from the class action 
settlement fund; 
d. The award of additional compensation to any Plaintiff. 
[Italicized for emphasis] R 1071 and 1072 (4th Amend. Comply ffif 118 and 125). 
(17) On September 6,1994, an order to show cause hearing was scheduled by 
the magistrate. Judge Judith Keep chose to become involved in place of Louisa Porter. 
R. 1073 (4th Amend Compl fflf 127-130). 
(18) At that September 6 hearing Judge Keep made permanent, verbatim, 
Magistrate Porter's constraint but indicated, confusingly, that David Bemiett could 
"pursue his individual claims." [Transcript 9-6-94, p. 18]. R. 1073 {4th Amend. Compl. ffl 
127-129.) 
(19) On December 30,1994, David Bennett filed a Complaint in Utah against 
the lawyers in Utah Third District Court. R. 1-75; see also R. 1074. 
(20) As stated in paragraph 133 (R. 1074) of plaintiff s Fourth Amended 
Complaint: 
The Complaint was precise in stating individual claims for breach of 
contract, legal malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty, and claims arising 
from the imposition by the defendants of severe mental and emotional 
distress upon David Bennett. No claims or damages were sought on behalf 
of any class, in compliance with Judge Keep's "Bar Order". 
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B. Written Decisions of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
(21) Notwithstanding that the California proceedings were then under active 
appellate review in the Ninth Circuit, Judge Keep ordered another district court hearing 
before her on May 1,1995. She acknowledged that individual letters had been submitted 
to her by each of the client named plaintiffs which advised the court that the lawyers were 
not authorized to impose an injunction on their brother and close friend David Bennett in 
their names. R. 1074-1075 (4th Amend. Comply f 136); and see also R. 825-831 
(Appellant's Brief, Attach. "6"). [Transcript, May 1, 1995, p. 4]. 
(22) In still another hearing, instigated as an "enforcement" proceeding by the 
defendant lawyers, Judge Keep on January 11,1996 revealed a professional bias: 
THE COURT: It is really with great sadness for the legal profession that I 
make this ruling today. The legal profession is under attack and personally 
I think most of the attacks under which it's ongoing are unwarranted. 
[Transcript 1-11-96, pp. 15-16] R. 1076 (4th Amend. CompL, U 141). 
(23) At that January 11, 1996 hearing Judge Keep imposed sanctions of more 
than $27,000 on David Bennett saying: 
'The criminal bar order prohibits Bennett and his attorneys from initiating 
and maintaining any lawsuit against class counsel which in any way 
involves...the competency of class counsel or counsel's legal services..." 
[Transcript Jan. 11, 1996, p. 18]. [Underlined for emphasis] R. 1076 {4th 
Amend. CompL para. 141). 
Over 100 paragraphs were ordered removed from David Bennett's Second Amended 
Complaint in Utah state court. R. 658-685 {Factual Allegations Deleted From Plaintiffs 
Second Amended Complaint). See also R. 586-698. 
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(24) At that January 11, 1996 hearing, Judge Keep misconceived that her orders 
"are final." "They are the law of this case and cannot be challenged today." [Transcript 
1-11-96, p.26]. R. 1076 (4th Amend. Compl ffif 143-144). 
(25) On June 14,1996, the Ninth Circuit Court "AFFIRMED, as so construed' 
Judge Keep's permanent restraint. But the Circuit Court essentially interpreted this non-
statutory injunction to allow David Bennett to proceed with his case in Utah against his 
former lawyers, revising Judge Keep. [Italics added]. R. 1077 (4th Amend. Compl. ^ 
147). Gen-Probe I. 
(26) Finally, on June 19, 1997, the Ninth Circuit Court issued a governing 
second Memorandum Decision that clearly REVERSED "The district court's orders 
finding Bennett in contempt.,.and requiring Bennett to amend his complaint and to 
pay sanctions." This Order stated in explicit terms: 
The district court may not prevent a Utah court from litigating malpractice 
and breach of contract issues relating to appellee law firm's representation 
of Bennett, because such litigation does not endanger or affect the "fruits 
and advantages" of the district court's judgment settling the underlying 
class action. Further, in adjudicating Bennett's malpractice and breach and 
contract claims, a Utah court may examine the adequacy of the class 
settlement, but only insofar as that settlement shed light on appellee law 
firm's representation of Bennett... [The bar order] should not be construed 
to limit Bennett to pursuit of his individual claims against the original 
class action defendant and to preclude any challenge to counsel's 
handling of the class action. 
*** 
After appealing the Bar Order, Bennett brought an action in Utah state court 
against his former lawyers. Bennett's Second Amended Complaint alleged 
six individual claims: 1) breach of the retainer agreement, 2) legal 
malpractice, 3) breach of fiduciary duty, 4) intentional infliction of 
emotional distress, 5) abuse of process, and 6) punitive damages. Bennett's 
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former lawyers asked the district court to find Bennett in contempt of the 
Bar Order. On January 11, 1996, before our decision in the earlier appeal, 
the district court declared Bennett and his counsel in contempt and ordered 
Bennett to amend his state court complaint, finding that many of the factual 
allegations in the complaint challenged the sufficiency and fairness of the 
class action settlement and the adequacy of the law firm's legal services on 
behalf of the class. The district court also ordered Bennett to pay, as a 
sanction, costs and attorney's fees of $27,720.36... 
Bennett's Second Amended Complaint does not assert any claim on behalf 
of the class and does not purport to affect the parties to the underlying class 
action settlement. When the complaint challenges the adequacy of the class 
settlement, it does so only insofar as it relates to the law firm's 
representation of Bennett. Similarly, Bennett's allegations concerning the 
law firm's representation of the class relate to his claims concerning his 
representation. The district court erred in holding that any challenge of 
the class threatened the finality of the class action judgment and in 
finding Bennett and his counsel in contempt 
The district court's orders finding Bennett and his counsel in contempt of 
the Bar Order and requiring Bennett to amend his complaint and to pay 
sanctions are REVERSED. 
[Bolded for Emphasis] 4th Amend Comply \ 147: R. 1077; see also Appellant's Brief 
Attach. "5" (R. 1743-1746). Gen-Probe II. 
C. Actions of Defendants and Judge Keep Which Had Continuing Impacts 
Against David Bennett's Causes of Action In Utah. 
(27) Prodded by the defendant lawyers herein, Judge Keep endeavored to 
dissuade and dismember David Bennett's lawsuit and to intimidate Judge Medley in 
Utah. R. 360-527, 746-754, 755-883, 528-1138. Judge Medley was directed that he 
could not proceed except in accordance with Judge Keep's notions of federal supremacy. 
Judge Medley stayed the case upon motions of the defendants. [R. 184-187, 188-223, 
755-757, 758-800]. 
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(28) On July 6, 1998, Judge Medley lifted the Stay he had ordered beginning 
April 26,1995. R. 884-885; 886-896, and 1041-1042 (Order). 
NOTICE: The Record as indicated in the appeal "INDEX" (Attachment "18") 
does not track the chronology of the underlying case as found in the Third District 
Court trial docket, appended herewith as Attachment "19" (Trial Court 
Docket). Details tracking the confusion are appended in Attachment "17" 
(Preliminary Notice), also filed in the addendum. 
III. ARGUMENT 
Defendant-appellees raise seven "Points" on appeal. Appellant David Bennett 
rebuts these chosen "points," stating them conversely in accordance with plaintiffs legal 
position. 
A painstaking review of the Complaint reveals that all of the claims were 
particularly pleaded. Judge Medley's decision to dismiss should be reversed. 
Point 1. Plaintiff's Fourth Amended Complant Did Show that Defendants' 
Caused Bennett Damages. 
Plaintiff-appellant David Bennett's Fourth Amended Complaint is replete with 
facts sufficient to support claims of breaches of contract (R. 1078), breaches of fiduciary 
duties and malpractice (R. 1082), abuse of process and intentional infliction of emotional 
distress (R. 1084), as well as deceit and collusion (R. 1089). R. 1043-1138. 
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In evaluating a trial court's decision to grant a motion to dismiss, an appellate 
court gives no deference and reviews the decision under a correctness standard: 
When determining whether a trial court properly granted a rule 12(b)(6) 
motion to dismiss, we accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true, 
and consider them and all reasonable inferences as true to be drawn from 
them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. 
St. Benedict's Development Co. v St. Benedict's Hospital 811 P.2d 194, 196 (Utah 
1991) (citing Colman v. Utah State Land Board. 795 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 1990). 
Moreover, 
[t]he courts — are a forum for settling controversies, and if there is any 
doubt about whether a claim should be dismissed for the lack of a factual 
basis, the issue should be resolved in favor of giving the party an 
opportunity to present its proof. 
Coleman, 795 P.2d at 624. 
"A motion to dismiss will be affirmed only 'where it appears to a certainty that the 
plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any state of facts which could be proved in 
support of its claims'" Heiner v. S.J. Grove & Sons Co.. 790 P.2d 107, 109 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990)(citing Arrow Industries v. Zions First Nat'l Bank, 767 P.2d 935, 936 (Utah 
1988). See also Clark v. Deloitte & Touche. 34 P.3d 209 (Utah 2001). 
Dismissal of a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) is a severe measure given 
the liberality of notice pleading, and must be granted only when it is 
apparent that under no set of facts proven in support of the claim as pleaded 
would a party be entitled to relief. 
Olson v. Park-Craig-Olsoii Inc., 815 P.2d 1356, 1359 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). See also, 
Conlev v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). A motion to dismiss is properly granted 
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only in cases where, even if the "factual assertions in the complaint were correct, they 
provided no legal basis for recovery". Lowe v. Sorenson Research Co. Inc.. 779 P.2d 
668, 670 (Utah 1989). 
But, defendant-appellees Jones Waldo ignore this proper Rule 12(b)(6) standard 
throughout their responsive brief by inventing competing factual allegations that seem 
contrary to what is pleaded by plaintiff. For example, appellees state that David Bennett 
was somehow allowed to speak to the settlement at the "fairness hearing" {Brief of 
Appellees the Law Firm of Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough; Christopher L. 
Burton; Sidney G. Baucom; and James S. Lowrie (hereinafter "Jones Waldo Brief), at p. 
3) - - however, just the opposite occurred and is so pleaded in the Fourth Amended 
Complaint at ^[106.3 "The issue is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail but 
whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims" pleaded in his 
complaint. Scheuer v. Rhodes. 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). 
Also contrary to another of defendant-appellees implications, "[p]roximate 
causation is generally a matter of fact to be determined by a jury", not appropriately 
challenged at the motion to dismiss stage. Cruz v. Middlekauff Lincoln-Mercury. Inc., 
909 P.2d 1252, 1257 (Utah 1996). 
3
 Speaking on behalf of all defendant/appellees herein, "MR. KJRBY: Your 
Honor, what he won't let go with is this class action. And the irony of it is, your Honor, 
if he wants to, as he continues to, to attack the class action, all he had to do was to stay in 
the case, appear at the fairness hearing, and then file a notice of appeal to the Ninth 
Circuit if he didn't think he could get justice in this court." Hearing Transcript, 1-11-96, 
page 2:16-21. R. 699-754. 
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As pleaded in the case at bar, plaintiff was burdened with reversing in the U.S. 
Ninth Circuit Court a personal and career-denigrating "permanent" "criminal" "Bar 
Order" contrived by the defendant lawyers, who were themselves the real parties in 
interest. The Bar Order threatened David Bennett from maintaining any action for years.4 
R. 365-1042. David Bennett was also hobbled in his lawsuit by other erroneous lower 
California federal court rulings induced by the defendant lawyers. E.g., R. 364-380, 586-
698,867-883. 
The Bar Order and its wrongful enforcement constituted prior restraint of "pure 
speech," such as was found to be in violation of the U.S. Constitution in Procter and 
Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co.. 78 F.3d. 219, 222-25 (6th Cir. 1996). The Sixth Circuit 
Court of Appeals rebuked Chief District Judge Feikens for failing "to conduct any First 
Amendment inquiry before granting the two TROs". Id at 225. 
[T]he documents in question are standard litigation filings. The private 
litigants' interest in protecting their vanity or commercial self-interest 
simply does not qualify as grounds for imposing a prior restraint.... The 
permanent injunction, therefore, was patently invalid and should never have 
been entered. 
IcL 
In United Mine Workers of Am. v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n. 389 U.S. 217, 222 
(1967), the U.S. Supreme Court held: The right to petition a court for redress is among 
the most "precious of the liberties safeguarded by the Bill of Rights". 
4
 On July 6, 1998, a Stay on the Utah proceedings was finally lifted. It was first 
imposed on April 26, 1995 by Judge Medley. 
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Acts incident to the Bar Order itself satisfy the elements - - including damages - -
of every claim pleaded including breaches of contract, breaches of fiduciary duties, 
malpractice, abuse of process and malicious prosecution by the defendants.5 R. 1043-
1138. See particularly 4th Amend. Compl ^ 148. R. 1078 (David Bennett paid out-of-
pocket fees and expenses of over $225,000 and three years time disrupted from his life to 
defend against the adjudged overbroad bar order and its wrongful enforcement.) 
As well, prior to the Bar Order, defendant/appellees mistreated client David 
Bennett during the underlying Gen-Probe case proceedings. Those facts separately 
underpin David Bennett's original claims for breach of the retainer agreement, breach of 
fiduciary duties, and deceit and collusion. See also Complaint (R. 1-75) and Amended 
Complaint (R. 76-156). 
On October 25, 1999, a motion to dismiss hearing was held before the Honorable 
Judge Medley.6 The following chart presented detailed particulars in support of claims 
5
 Defendants have tried to assert that David Bennett's lawyer-pressured "opting 
out" of the Gen-Probe class action somehow immunized them from redress. But, "The 
class is not the client". Mandujano v. Basic Vegetable Products. Inc.. 541 F.2d 832, 835 
(9th Cir. 1976). David Bennett was the client most concerned, and he can bring 
malpractice charges later against the lawyers. Durkin v. Shea & Gould [law firm]. 92 
F.3d 1510, 1518 (9th Cir. 1996). Indeed, plaintiff David Bennett was economically 
unable to bring direct claims against Gen-Probe, Inc. without the benefit of the class 
action vehicle, and a law firm to advance costs. He was also feasibly precluded from 
asserting derivative claims that had been dropped. 
6
 "In reviewing the dismissal, we must keep in mind that the purpose of a rule 
12(b)(6) motion is to challenge the formal sufficiency of the claim for relief, not to 
establish the facts or resolve the merits of a case." Whipple v. American Fork Irrigation 
Co.. 910 P.2d 1218, 1220 (Utah 1996). 
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pleaded in plaintiff s Fourth Amended Complaint: 
SUMMARY CHART OF EACH CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER UTAH LAW AND 
THE CORRELATIVE PARAGRAPHS IN DAVID BENNETT'S COMPLAINT 
A. LEGAL MALPRACTICE: NEGLIGENCE 
Duty: paragraphs 8, 38, 51, 54, 156. 
Breach: paras. 55, 56, 58, 60, 69-74, 83, 85, 88, 91, 98, 104, 159, 160-
164, 169-177. 
Actual Cause and Prox. Cause: paras. 59, 107-109, 176-178, 181. 
Damages: paras. 61, 74(b), 86, 100, 103, 106, 141, 143, 146, 148, 166, 
176, 179. 
B. BREACH OF CONTRACT 
Writing: paragraphs 38, 66, 157. 
Parties Signing: paras. 46, 47, 153. 
Certain Terms: paras. 43, 79, 154, 155, 165. 
Breach: paras. 67, 71, 82, 83, 88, 91, 98, 104, 146, 158-164, 169- 178. 
Damages: paras. 68, 74(b), 100, 103, 106, 107-109, 143, 148, 166, 176-
77, 179. 
C. BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY 
Duty Owed: paragraphs 8, 38, 51, 54, 156, 168. 
Breach Duty: paras. 55, 56, 58, 60, 69, 70-74, 83, 85, 88, 91, 98, 104, 
150, 160-164, 169-177. 
Actual Cause and proximate: paras. 59, 107-109, 176-77, 181; 
Damages: paras. 61, 74(b), 86, 100, 103, 106, 141, 146, 148, 176, 179. 
D. ABUSE OF PROCESS / WRONGFUL INSTITUTION OF CIVIL 
PROCEEDINGS 
Proceedings instituted with malice by Ds without 
probable cause: paragraphs 118, 119, 124, 125, 128, 134, 137, 140, 182, 
183, 184, 186, 200. 
Primary purpose improper: paras. 125, 130, 135-137, 143, 145, 182, 184-
90, 192, 193. 
Proceedings terminate in favor of David Bennett: paras. 142, 147, 195. 
E. INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS / OUTRAGEOUS 
CONDUCT 
Defs. extreme/outrageous conduct: paragraphs 69, 70(c)-(g), 73, 81, 83, 
85, 88, 98, 101, 174-179, 182-197, 198-204. 
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P'sharm: paras. 86, 88, 89, 177, 193-94, 196-197. 
Damages: paras. 107-109,141, 148, 178, 179, 193-194, 196-197,203-204. 
F. DECEIT / MISREPRESENTATION (Statutory U.C.A. 78-51-31): 
paragraphs 198-204, and 4(a) for the prayer for relief. 
R. 2147 (Hearing Transcript, October 25, 1999, pp. 48:23-25). This chairt is sometimes 
referred to herein as a "Summary Chart of Claims". See complete chart at Attach. "12", 
Appellant's Brief 
Current case law is that breaches of fiduciary duties to clients, as were pleaded, 
need not necessarily cause direct damages - - only that a lawyer has taken some self-
serving advantage. R. 1082-1085. See Milbank Tweed Hadley & McCloy [law firm] v. 
Boon, 13 F.3d 537, 543 (2nd Or. 1994) ('"Prophylactic rule' applied so that a former 
client did not have to show strict 'but for' causation or proximate cause"). See also 
Gilchrist v.Perl 387 N.W.2d 412, 416 (Minn. 1986). 
In order to get a "quick pay" settlement (R. 1063), the lawyers seemingly 
converted plaintiff's claims in Gen-Probe as if they were the lawyers' own. (R. 1071-
1077). Jones Waldo pushed aside client David Bennett, whom they decided not to 
represent, primarily to achieve their own objectives. They acted as if they were the real 
parties in interest. Compare the Supreme Court declaration in Margulies v. Upchurch: 
It is our strong view that an attorney [Jones Waldo] who is simultaneously 
representing two clients with differing interests should not be able to avoid 
conforming to Canon 5 by simply dropping one of the clients at his option 
when a disqualification motion is filed. 
[Bracket added] 696 P.2d 1195,1203 (Utah 1985). Such abandonment is actionable. 
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In Interclaim Holdings Ltd. v. Ness. Motley, Loadholt Richardson and Poole [law 
firm], a complaint alleged that the defendant protected class interests to the detriment of 
an abandoned client. The federal court held that the claims for breaches of retainer 
agreement and fiduciary duties could not be dismissed under FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE, Rule 12(b)(6) standards - - despite the abandoned client's possible claims 
against some underlying defendants (no settlement had yet been reached). 2001 WL 
1313799, page *6, 7-8 (N.D. 111. Oct. 29, 2001). See appended Attachment "22". 
Point 2. Plaintiff's Complaint Was Not an Attack On Federal Court Rulings, 
And Is Not Barred By Any Doctrine Of Issue Preclusion. 
The Ninth Circuit Court in Gen-Probe I stated: 
The bar order contains a disclaimer that it does not "restrain David D. 
Bennett from pursuing solely his individual claims . . . ." This should not 
be construed to limit Bennett to pursuit of his individual claims against the 
original class action defendant and to preclude any challenge to counsel's 
handling of the class action. 
We hold, however, that the bar order cannot be construed to prevent 
Bennett from litigating issues in his malpractice and breach of contract 
actions that relate to class counsels' handling of the class action.. . . 
87 F.3d 1317. R. 1077. See also Brief of Post Kirby Appellees, Attach, "3". 
In Gen-Probe II, the court again held that plaintiffs complaint was not a collateral attack 
on the Gen-Probe settlement. Gen-Probe II. See Attach. "5", Appellant's Brief 
Following a settlement, even one from which a client does not timely exclude himself, the 
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client may bring malpractice charges later against his lawyers.7 Durkin, 92 F.3d at 1518. 
A class action judgment cannot be used to collaterally estop an opt-out 
plaintiffs action against a defendant in a separate action. An opt out 
plaintiff is not a party to the class action and is not bound by the class 
action judgment. The doctrine of collateral estoppel cannot bind [such] a 
person. 
In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig.. 756 F.2d 411, 418-419 (5th Cir. 
1985)(underscored for emphasis). See also related arguments in Reply Brief of Appellant 
David Bennett to the Brief of Post Kirby Appellees. 
Point 3. Plaintiffs Third Cause of Action States a Claim for Intentional 
Infliction of Emotional Distress and Abuse of Process, 
For attorneys of record intentionally to breach their duty of loyalty to a client by 
acting as an opposing advocate in persuading a judge to impose permanent criminal 
sanctions is reprehensible. The Supreme Court in State v. Holland stated: 
At the very least, this duty of loyalty requires attorneys to refrain from 
acting as an advocate against their client. 
921 P. 2d 430, 435-436 (Utah 1996). Further, in attempted enforcement ithereof, Michael 
Kirby later admitted to the Ninth Circuit Court that out-of-open-court, ex parte 
discussions, even undisclosed exchanges of documents in chambers, took place between 
the lawyers and a lower court federal judge. 4th Amend. Compl, ffif 118-120 and 130: R. 
1071-1073. 
7
 Further, a federal district court does not possess ancillary jurisdiction over a 
new lawsuit like that brought subsequently by David Bennett in Utah against his own 
lawyers: Peacock v. Thomas. 516 U.S. 349 (1996). 
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The foregoing circumstance is included in David Bennett's Fourth Amended 
Complaint (R. 1043-1138), which stated all the conceptual elements of claims alleging 
malicious prosecution, abuse of process and intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
See Summary Chart of Claims, and Appellant's Brief, Attach. "12". 
Point 4. Plaintiff Stated a Claim For Deceit and Collusion. 
The Jones Waldo defendants imply that they have an absolute privilege as a matter 
of law intentionally to deceive "a court or judge or a party" including their client in any 
judicial proceeding. Jones Waldo Brief, p. 28, footnote 4. Contrary to Jones Waldo's 
assertion, Section 78-51-31 of the Utah Code Annotated (1996)(repealed April 2001) 
provided for over 100 years sanctions against lawyers who collude against courts or 
deceive courts and parties. Although repealed in April 2001, that statute was applicable 
and in effect during all times pertinent to this litigation. This type statute specifically 
exempts such improper lawyer behavior from immunity and establishes a cause of action 
with treble damages to the injured party (e.g., the lawyers' client). Silberg v. Anderson, 
786 P.2d 365, 373, 373 n.6 (Cal. 1990); see also Eaton v. Morse, 687 P.2d 1004, 1011 
(Mont. 1984). 
The Post Kirby and Jones Waldo lawyers deceived both California and Utah 
courts and their client,which demonstrably injured their client-plaintiff David Bennett. 
David Bennett's Fourth Amended Complaint is replete with instances of deceit and 
collusion throughout the course of representation. E.g. see Summary Chart of Claims; 
and R. 1089-1097 (4th Amend Compl, ffif 198-204; see also R. 1058-1078 (4th Amend. 
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Compl. fflf 63-151); R. 1071-1073 (4th Amend Comply % 118-120 and 130) and R. 1069 
(4th Amend. Compl. ffif 107-109). 
There is no defense against a deceit and collusion statute, except a showing of 
contrary facts. 
Point 5. The Utah Trial Court is the Proper Forum for Plaintiff-Appellant 
to Gain a Full Adjudication on the Merits. 
As provided in the Retainer Agreement between the parties, the Utah Third 
District Court has full jurisdiction of parties and causes as the appropriate venue for 
adjudication of this case on the merits. R. 1053-1054. See Tf 19 of the Retainer 
Agreement in Exhibit 1 of the 4th Amend. Compl., R. 1101-1111. 
Point 6. The Statute of Limitations as to Defendants Baucom and Lowrie 
was Tolled While the Stay Order by Judge Medley was Still in 
Effect. 
The Third District Court Stay and the Federal District Court Bar Order were 
induced by defendants Sidney Baucom and James Lowrie and others in the Jones Waldo 
firm in concert with Post Kirby. The Stay Order issued and continued (R. 789 and 360) 
by Judge Medley prevented plaintiff from proceeding on his lawsuit or from voluntarily 
amending his Complaint between (at least) the dates of April 26, 1995 (R. 355-356) and 
July 6, 1998 (R. 1041-1042). See also Attach. "8", Appellant's Brief. 
The Stay Order tolled the statute of limitations as to defendants Baucom and 
Lowrie for the period David Bennett was not free to add them as defendants. See Section 
78-12-41, U.C.A. The Stay was finally lifted on July 6, 1998 (R. 1041-1042); the Fourth 
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Amended Complaint was filed July 7,1998. 
Amendments made to David Bennett's Complaints were ordered by Judge Keep 
under duress of criminal sanctions. R. 528-582 (Plaintiffs Third Amended Complaint) 
and R. 381-458 (Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint). These coercive orders 
compelled David Bennett to purge his Utah complaints of over 100 factual statements and 
charges against the defendant lawyers. R. 1743-1746. 
Retained claims against defendants Baucom and Lowrie fall well within relevant 
statutory periods. See Sections 78-12-23(2) and 78-12-25(3), U.C.A.. Accordingly, 
Where a law firm represents a client, each individual attorney within the 
firm generally has an attorney-client relationship with that client. 
Kilpatrick v. Wilev, Rein & Fielding [law firml 2001 WL 1590475,1f 82 ( Utah, 2001). 
Plaintiff David Bennett timely and rightly filed a complaint against both Baucom and 
Lowrie; law and equity warrant a tolling of the statute of limitations. Mr. Baucom was 
instrumental in procuring the bar order. R. 1070-1071. James Lowrie was Chairman of 
Litigation for Jones Waldo from the time the Gen-Probe case was undertaken, and later 
assumed from Christopher Burton to be "lead counsel". See Attachment "20". In April 
of 1995, Lowrie began a more visible hands-on role, attending hearings in both Utah and 
California. R. 2146. As attorneys with Jones Waldo, both parties clearly had knowledge 
of the suit and their roles. UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, Rule 15(c) allows 
amendment under the circumstances of the case at bar, which Equity would clearly 
sustain. 
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As to when the statute of limitations clock begins, the Utah Supreme Court in 
Berenda v. Langford. 914 P.2d 45, 50 (1996) has held that 
Generally, a cause of action accrues "upon the happening of the last event 
necessary to complete the cause of action." Myers v. McDonald, 635 P.2d 
84, 86 (Utah 1981). 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has stated in Tiberi v. CIGNA Corp.. 89 
F.3dl423, 1430-1431: 
Under the continuing wrong doctrine, however, "where a tort involves a 
continuing or repeated injury, the cause of action accrues at, and limitations 
begin to run from, the date of the last injury." 54 CJ.S. Limitation of 
Actions § 177 (1987)4 In other words, "the statue of limitations does not 
begin to run until the wrong is over with." Taylor v. Meirick, 712 F.2d 
1112, 1118 (7th Cir. 1983). 
Accordingly, the statute of limitations should begin after the Medley Stay Order on July 
6, 1998 was lifted rather than when Baucom "fired" his client on August 17, 1992 as 
suggested in the Jones Waldo Brief* 
Point 7. The Lower Court Did Not Adequately Set Forth the Basis of its Ruling 
Upon Which Appeal Had to be Taken. 
Judge Tyrone Medley failed adequately to set forth the basis of his ruling upon 
which this appeal had to be taken. UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, Rule 52 states: 
8
 Contrary to U.S. DISTRICT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA, LOCAL 
RULES OF PRACTICE, Rule 83.5(j)(3), Jones Waldo never withdrew as plaintiff- client 
David Bennett's attorney of record. Jones Waldo undertook a joint representation of all 
plaintiffs in that case and when a conflict arose between plaintiff clients, the defendant 
lawyers and law firms knew or should have known per Margulies [Jones Waldo law firm] 
that they cannot choose between clients in that case but had an affirmative duty (1) to 
withdraw immediately representing all other clients in that case and (2) to withdraw 
immediately from that case. 
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The court shall, however, issue a brief written statement of the ground for 
its decision on all motions granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, 59 
when the motion is based on more than one ground. 
No specific judicial findings appear in the record for review on appeal.9 
In the matter at bar, the trial court's blanket ruling preclusively granting 
defendants' motion to dismiss was vague as to reasoning. UTAH RULES OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE, Rule 52(a), essentially requires an articulation for dismissals with prejudice. 
The appellate court should not have to divine a trial court's reasoning. Retherford v. 
AT&T Communications of the Mt. States. Inc., 844 P.2d 949, 958 n. 4 (Utah 1992). 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff-appellant David Bennett seeks a day in court on the substantive merits of 
his lawsuit. This Court should reverse the trial court's dismissal of plaintiff s Fourth 
Amended Complaint. The Fourth Amended Complaint pleads elements supporting all 
causes of action. 
nil/ 
Respectfully submitted and dated this * / day of January, 2002. 
Franklin Reed. Bennett 
Daniel G. Moquin 
Counsel for Plaintiff-Appellant David D. Bennett 
9
 A statement of grounds found by the trial court to justify summaiy judgment is 
of great assistance to the appellate court; failure to set forth some specific statement of 
grounds may justify remand. Masters v. Worsley. 777 P.2d 499 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
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V. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Re: David D. Bennett v. The Law Firm of Jones. Waldo. Holbrook and McDonough. et 
al» Utah Supreme Court, Case No. 2001-0296-SC 
I hereby certify that on this \H& day of January, 2002,1 caused to be sent, 
through the United States mail, first-class, postage prepaid, two (2) true and correct 
copies of the 
REPLY OF 
APPELLANT 
DAVID D. BENNETT 
TO 
THE RESPONSE BRIEF OF 
JONES WALDO APPELLEES 
addressed to each of the following: 
R. Brent Stephens 
Maralyn M. Reger 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & 
MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
James S. Jardine 
Rick B. Hoggard 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
(801)532-1500 
79 South Main Street 
Post Office Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385 
?AAA,AA 
Jeririy L. Ayres/ 
Business Manager & Legal Assistant 
Law Office of Franklin Reed Bennett 
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VI. ADDENDUM 
The attachments of plaintiff/appellant's briefs are sequentially numbered. Thus, 
Attachments 1-14 are contained in the Brief of Appellant David D. Bennett. Attachments 
15-16 are appended to this Reply Brief of Appellant David D. Bennett to the Brief of Post 
Kirby Appellees. 
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Tabl 
January 14, 2002 
PRELIMINARY NOTICE 
The Record as indicated in the attached appeal "INDEX" does not track the 
chronology of the underlying case as it is found in the Third District Court trial docket as 
detailed in Attachment "11". (Trial Court Docket). For example 
1. Index document pages R. 746-883 (covering the last half of year 1995) 
should come directly after R. 527 (page 69 of the Second Amended 
Complaint), but does not. 
2. R. 528-745 (covering the entire year 1996) should then follow the above 
mentioned R. 883, but does not. 
3. R. 884-1853 (years 1998 to 2001) should directly follow after 745 
(mentioned above), but does not. 
4. Plaintiff's Motion to Lift Stay, key document designated in the Index as R. 
884-885, is erroneously dated "05/20/95"; it should show 05/20/98 
5. All documents filed after 01/24/01 are missing from the Index - - including 
plaintiffs Notice of Appeal and the trial court's Final Order from which the 
appeal was taken. 
6. Other documents appear to be missing from the Index. Including a 
Supplemental Authority filing by plaintiff dated June 21, 1999. 
For over two years (from at least January 14,1999 to February 1, 2001), Volume II 
1 
of the trial court record (06-05-95 to 02-22-96) was missing. That volume contained the 
mixed-up record. 
On December 13, 1999, aware of the (1 year) long-lost Volume II, plaintiff David 
Bennett created a judge-approved reconstituted Volume II that accounted for all trial 
court docket entries in chronological order. R. 1859-1874: Notice and Stipulation 
Regarding Filing of Reconstituted Volume II of Court Record, entered 12/13/99. 
But, on February 1, 2001, the day the lost volume was reportedly found, the Index 
was prepared by a court clerk. For some reason, the clerk chose to prepare the Index 
using the compromised newly-found Volume II - - not the complete reconstituted Volume 
II. As well, the clerk failed to place the mixed up Volume II in chronological order 
before preparing the Index. 
Plaintiff David Bennett is concerned that a cursory reading of the INDEX in this 
case could mislead a Supreme Court Justice into believing that the Second Amended 
Complaint and the Third Amended Complaint were filed in tandem - - without any 
intervening interference from Judge Judith Keep of the U.S. District Court for the 
Southern District of California - - including David Bennett being held in contempt (later 
reversed) for filing a Second Amended Complaint of his choosing. As well, the Third 
Amended Complaint was filed under protest due to over 100 factual paragraphs being 
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I CERTIFY THAT THIS «& &TRUE COPY OF AN 
ORIGINAL DOCUMENT OM FILE !N THE THIRD 
J)STRJCT COURT, SALT 4AKE COUNTY. STATE 
OFUTAH. 
DATE 
DEPUTY COURT CLERK 
INDEX 
DISTRICT COURT NO 940908220 
SUPREME COURT NO 20010296-SC 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
DATE PAGE 
FILED DOCUMENT NUMBERS 
12/30/94 COMPLAINT 1-75 
01/21/95 AMENDED COMPLAINT 76-156 
01/27/95 SUMMONS (CHRISTOPHER L BURTON, ESQ) 157-159 
01/27/95 SUMMONS (LAW FIRM OF JONES, WALDO, HOLDBROOK 160-162 
& MCDONOUGH) 
01/31/95 NOTICE OF ORDERS AUTHORIZING COMPLAINT 163-183 
02/03/95 RULE 12 (b) MOTION TO DISMISS AND MOTION TO 184-187 
STAY BRIEFING AND HEARING ON 12 (b) MOTION TO 
DISMISS 
02/03/95 MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 12 (b) MOTION TO 188-223 
DISMISS AND MOTION TO STAY BRIEFING AND 
HEARING ON 12 (b) MOTION TO DISMISS UNTIL AFTER 
RULING OF UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR 
THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 
02/17/95 PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 224-250 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS AND STAY 
PROCEEDING 
02/17/95 CERTIFICATE OF HAND-DELIVERY RE PLAINTIFF'S 251-252 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' 
MOTIONS TO DISMISS AND TO STAY 
02/27/95 REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 12 (b) MOTION 253-349 
TO DISMISS AND MOTION TO STAY BRIEFING AND 
HEARING ON 12 (b) MOTION TO DISMISS UNTIL AFTER 
RULING OF UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 
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INDEX 
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03/06/95 MINUTE ENTRY 350-351 
04/10/95 MINUTE ENTRY 352 
04/10/95 ORDER FOR SCHEDULING CONFERENCE 353-354 
04/26/95 ORDER 355-357 
05/12/95 MINUTE ENTRY 358-359 
06/06/95 MINUTE ENTRY 360 
06/27/95 PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF FILING DATE FOR SECOND 361-363 
AMENDED COMPLAINT 
NO DATE COPY OF ORDER (UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 364-365 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA) 
NO DATE TRANSCRIPT OF MOTION HEARING BEFORE THE 366-380 
HONORABLE JUDITH N. KEEP, UNITED STATES 
DISTRICT JUDGE (UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA) ON 05/01/95 
08/01 /95 PLAINTIFF'S SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT 381-458 
08/01/95 PLAINTIFF'S SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT 459-527 
02/09/96 PLAINTIFF'S THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT 528-582 
02/09/96 MOTION FOR ENTRY OF ORDER PERMITTING PLAINTIFF 583-584 
TO AMEND HIS SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT 
02/09/96 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 585 
02/09/96 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICES 
02/16/96 NOTICE OF SUBMISSION OF PLEADINGS IN CASE NO. 586-698 
90-1183 G/K (POR) IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT 
COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 
02/22/96 NOTICE OF FILING ORDER AND TRANSCRIPT FROM 699-754 
THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA, CIVIL CASE 
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INDEX 
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RENEWAL OF RULE 12 (b) MOTION TO DISMISS AND 
MOTION TO STAY BRIEFING AND HEARING ON 12(b) 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF RENEWAL OF RULE 
12(b) MOTION TO DISMISS AND MOTION TO STAY 
BRIEFING AND HEARING ON 12(b) MOTION TO DISMISS 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO SCHEDULE STATUS 
CONFERENCE AND REMOVE STAY; AND MOTION IN 
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' SECOND MOTION TO 
STAY 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO SCHEDULE STATUS 
CONFERENCE AND REMOVE STAY; AND MOTION IN 
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' SECOND MOTION TO 
STAY 
PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION 805-834 
TO SCHEDULE STATUS CONFERENCE AND REMOVE 
STAY; AND MOTION IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' 
2ND MOTION TO STAY 
PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION 
TO SCHEDULE STATUS CONFERENCE AND REMOVE 
STAY; AND MOTION IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' 
2ND MOTION TO STAY 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
TRANSCRIPT OF MOTION HEARING BEFORE THE 
HONORABLE JUDITH N. KEEP, UNITED STATES 
JUDGE (UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT/SOUTHERN 
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09/14/95 PARTIAL TRANSCRIPT (PAGE 11) OF MOTION HEARING 882-883 
BEFORE THE HONORABLE JUDITH N. KEEP, UNITED 
STATES DISTRICT JUDGE (UNITED STATES DISTRICT 
COURT/SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA/WESTERN 
REGION) ON 05/01/95 
05/20/9^ PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO LIFT STAY 884-885 
05/20/98 MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 886-896 
TO LIFT STAY 
05/20/98 PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND 897-898 
COMPLAINT 
05/20/98 MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 899-908 
FOR LEAVE TO AMEND COMPLAINT 
05/20/98 PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO ADD PARTY DEFENDANTS 909-910 
05/20/98 MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 911 -929 
TO ADD PARTY DEFENDANTS 
05/20/98 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 930-931 
05/20/98 ENTRY OF APPEARANCE 932-933 
05/20/98 AFFIDAVIT OF R. PRIYA SESHACHARI IN SUPPORT OF 934-1032 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND 
COMPLAINT 
05/22/98 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 1033-1035 
07/06/98 PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE TO SUBMIT FOR DECISION 1036-1038 
07/06/98 STIPULATION 1039-1040 
07/06/98 ORDER 1041-1042 
07/07/98 FOURTH AMENDED COMPLAINT 1043-1138 
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08/14/98 STIPULATION 1142-1144 
09/04/98 APPLICATION TO FILE OVERLENGTH MEMORANDUM 1145-1148 
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S 
FOURTH AMENDED COMPLAINT 
09/04/98 DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S 1149-1151 
FOURTH AMENDED COMPLAINT 
09/04/98 MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION 1152-1253 
TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S FOURTH AMENDED 
COMPLAINT 
09/14/98 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' APPLICATION TO 1254-1256 
OVERLENGTH MEMORANDUM 
10/13/98 SUMMONS 1257-1259 
10/13/98 SUMMONS 1260-1262 
10/16/98 AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID D. BENNETT 1263-1381 
11/25/98 POST KIRBY'S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF 1382-1384 
PERSONAL JURISDICTION 
11/25/98 EX PARTE APPLICATION TO FILE OVERLENGTH 1385-1391 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF POST KIRBY'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF PERSONAL 
JURISDICTION 
11/25/98 POST KIRBY'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION 1392-1429 
TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION 
11/25/98 AFFIDAVIT OF MICHAEL L. KIRBY IN SUPPORT OF 1430-1585 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
12/04/98 ORDER GRANTING EX PARTE APPLICATION TO FILE 1586-1587 
OVERLENGTH MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF POST 
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01/11/99 AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID D. BENNETT IN OPPOSITION TO 1588-1665 
MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF IN PERSONAM 
JURISDICTION 
01/11/99 MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO POST KIRBY'S 1666-1685 
MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF PERSONAL 
JURISDICTION 
01/11/99 EX PARTE APPLICATION TO FILE OVERLENGTH 1686-1687 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO POST KIRBY'S 
MOTION DISMISS 
01/19/99 AMENDED AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID BENNETT IN 1688-1754 
OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DISMISS 
01/19/99 EX PARTE APPLICATION TO FILE OVERLENGTH 1755-1757 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO JONES WALDO'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
01/19/99 MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO 1758-1785 
DISMISS 
02/09/99 MOTION FOR LEAVE TO WITHDRAW AS CO-COUNSEL 1786-1787 
FOR PLAINTIFF 
03/26/99 REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO 1788-1809 
DISMISS OF DEFENDANTS' JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK 
& MCDONOUGH, CHRISTOPHER L. BURTON, SIDNEY G. 
BAUCOM AND JAMES S. LOWRIE 
04/22/99 POST KIRBY'S REQUEST TO FILE AN OVERLENGTH 1810-1816 
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO 
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NOTICE TO SUBMIT FOR DECISION POST KIRBY'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK FOR PERSONAL 
JURISDICTION AND REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT 
ORDER FOR OVERLENGTH REPLY MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF 
PERSONAL JURISDICTION 
POST KIRBY'S REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF PERSONAL 
JURISDICTION 
NOTICE TO SUBMIT FOR DECISION AND MOTION TO 
SET HEARING DATE FOR ORAL ARGUMENT ON 
MOTIONS 
NOTICE OF ORAL ARGUMENT 
NOTICE OF ORAL ARGUMENT 
MINUTES - ORAL ARGUMENT 
NOTICE AND STIPULATION REGARDING FILING OF 
RECONSTITUTED VOLUME II OF COURT RECORD 
EX PARTE MOTION FOR ORDER REGARDING 
RECONSTITUTED VOLUME II OF COURT FILE 
MINUTE ENTRY 
NOTICE OF PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTIONS TO A MINUTE 
ENTRY AND PROPOSED ORDER 
POST KIRBY'S RESPONSE TO BENNETT'S NOTICE OF 
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RULE 54(b) JUDGMENT ON ALL CLAIMS AGAINST 
POST, KIRBY, NOONAN & SWEAT, LLP, MICHAEL 
L. KIRBY A.P.C., AND MICHAEL L. KIRBY 
INDIVIDUALLY 
REPLY OF PLAINTIFF IN SUPPORT OF HIS NOTICE OF 
OBJECTIONS TO A MINUTE ENTRY AND PROPOSED 
ORDER 
NOTICE TO SUBMIT FOR SIGNATURE THE PROPOSED 
RULE 54(b) JUDGMENT ON ALL CLAIMS AGAINST 
DEFENDANTS POST, KIRBY, NOONAN & SWEAT, LLP, 
MICHAEL L. KIRBY A.P.C. AND MICHAEL L. KIRBY 
INDIVIDUALLY 
RULE 54(b) JUDGMENT ON ALL CLAIMS AGAINST 
DEFENDANTS POST, KIRBY, NOONAN & SWEAT, LLP, 
MICHAEL L. KIRBY A.P.C., AND MICHAEL L. KIRBY 
INDIVIDUALLY 
NOTICE OF ENTRY OF JUDGMENT 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO THE 
COURT UNDER RULE 60 TO STRIKE A FEBRUARY 28™, 
2000 RULING; AND TO DECIDE A TIMELY RULE 59 
MOTION 
MOTION TO THE COURT UNDER RULE 60 TO STRIKE 
A FEBRUARY 28™, 2000 RULING; AND TO DECIDE UPON 
A TIMELY FILED RULE 59 MOTION 
POST KIRBY'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
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NOTICE OF APPEAL OF FINAL ORDER 
SUPREME COURT LETTER 
NOTICE TO SUBMIT FOR DECISION 
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO THE 
COURT UNDER RULE 60 TO STRIKE A FEBRUARY 28™, 
2000 RULING; AND TO DECIDE UPON A TIMELY FILED 
RULE 59 MOTION 
NOTICE OF ORAL ARGUMENT 
RESPONSE TO OBJECTION TO PROPOSED ORDER 
NOTICE TO SUBMIT AND REQUEST FOR RULING 
NOTICE OF ENTRY OF APPEARANCE OF COUNSEL FOR 
PLAINTIFF DAVID D. BENNETT 
MINUTES - ORAL ARGUMENT 
LETTER TO R. BRENT STEPHENS FROM JAMES N. 
BARBER DATED 08/31/00 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE AS TO 
DEFENDANTS JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & 
MCDONOUGH, CHRISTOPHER L. BURTON, SIDNEY G. 
BAUCOM AND JAMES S. LOWRIE 
NOTICE BY PLAINTIFF OF SUMMARY DOCUMENT 
PRESENTED AT HEARING 
MINUTES - TELEPHONE CONFERENCE/RULING 
NOTICE TO THE COURT OF A CLARIFICATION TO 
ARGUMENT 
NOTICE OF OBJECTIONS TO PROPOSED ORDER 
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10/26/00 SUPREME COURT NOTICE OF DECISION 1991 
10/26/00 SUPREME COURT ORDER 1992-1993 
10/30/00 POST KIRBY'S RESPONSE TO NOTICE OF OBJECTIONS 1994-1996 
TO PROPOSED ORDER 
10/31/00 NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL OF PRJYA S. SANGER, ESQ. 1997-1999 
10/31/00 NOTICE OF APPEAL 2000-2002 
11/01/00 NOTICE OF UTAH SUPREME COURT RULING 2003-2010 
CONTRARY TO THE DISTRICT COURT'S TENTATIVE 
DECISION AND REQUEST FOR STATUS CONFERENCE 
11/03/00 NOTICE OF FILING OF BOND FOR COSTS ON APPEAL 2011-2013 
11/03/00 SUPREME COURT LETTER TO DANIEL G. MOQUIN 2014-2015 
DATED 11/02/00 
11/15/00 MOTION RE SECOND REQUEST FOR STATUS 2016-2018 
CONFERENCE 
11/15/00 MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 2019-2036 
RE SECOND REQUEST FOR STATUS CONFERENCE 
11/16/00 MOTION THAT THIS COURT ACT PURSUANT TO ORDER 2037-2040 
OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT ENTERED 10/25/00 
11/16/00 MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S 2041-2051 
MOTION THAT THIS COURT ACT PURSUANT TO ORDER 
OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT ENTERED 10/25/00 
11/16/00 ATTACHMENTS TO MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 2052-2102 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION THAT THIS COURT ACT 
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11/22/00 POST KIRBY'S RESPONSE TO BENNETT'S PENDING 2103-2117 
FILINGS AND REQUEST THAT THE COURT ENTER 
PROPOSED ORDER 
11/27/00 ORDER DENYING OUTSTANDING MOTIONS 2118-2120 
12/01100 COPY OF COVER PAGE OF REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT 2121 
OF PROCEEDINGS: TELEPHONE CONFERENCE 10/06/00 
12/01100 COPY OF COVER PAGE OF REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT 2122 
OF PROCEEDINGS: ORAL ARGUMENT 10/25/99 
12/04/00 LETTER TO JUDGE MEDLEY FROM DANIEL G. MOQUIN 2123-2125 
DATED 11/30/00 
12/04/00 MINUTE ENTRY 2126-2127 
12/04/00 REPLY IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF' S MOTION THAT 2128-213 3 
THIS COURT ACT PURSUANT TO ORDER OF THE 
UTAH SUPREME COURT ENTERED 10/25/00 
12/07/00 NOTICE TO SUBMIT FOR DECISION 2134-2136 
12/07/00 NOTICE TO SUBMIT FOR DECISION 2137-2139 
12/15/00 MINUTES - TELEPHONE CONFERENCE 2140 
12/29/00 NOTICE OF ORAL ARGUMENT 2141 -2143 
01/24/01 MINUTES - CONTINUANCE 2144-2145 
07/31/95 REPORTERSS TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS: 2146 
DEFENDANT'S MOTIONS ON 04/10/95 
12/01100 REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS: 2147 
ORAL ARGUMENT ON 10/25/99 
12/01/00 REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS: 2148 
TELEPHONE CONFERENCE 10/06/00 
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT SALT LAKE 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID BENNETT vs. WALDO HOLBROOK JONES 
E NUMBER 940908220 {Civil} 
RENT ASSIGNED JUDGE 
TYRONE E. MEDLEY 
TIES 
Plaintiff - DAVID BENNETT 
Represented by: JAMES N. BARBER 
Represented by: DAVID L. SANDERS 
Represented by: DANIEL G. MOQUIN 
Defendant - WALDO HOLBROOK JONES 
Represented by: ROBERT H HENDERSON 
Represented by: R. BRENT STEPHENS 
Defendant - CHRISTOPHER L BURTON 
Represented by: ROBERT H HENDERSON 
Represented by: R. BRENT STEPHENS 
Represented by: RICK B HOGGARD 
OUNT SUMMARY 
















REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COMPLAINT-NO AMT SPC 
Amount Paid: 150.00 
Amount Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COPY FEE 
Amount Due: 1.00 
Amount Paid: 1.00 
Amount Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
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REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: VIDEO TAPE COPY 
Amount Due: 15.00 
Amount Paid: 15.00 
Amount Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COPY FEE 
Amount Due: 2.00 
Amount Paid: 2.00 
Amount Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COPY FEE 
Printed: 01/08/02 14:25:33 Page 2 








































REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COPY FEE 
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REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: VIDEO TAPE COPY 
Amount Due: 15.00 
Amount Paid: 15.00 
Amount Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COPY FEE 
Amount Due: 3.25 
Amount Paid: 3.25 
Amount Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: CERTIFIED COPIES 
Amount Due: 1.50 
Amount Paid: 1.50 
Amount Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: CERTIFICATION 
Amount Due: 2.00 
Amount Paid: 2.00 
Amount Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
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REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: VIDEO TAPE COPY 
Amount Due: 15.00 
Amount Paid: 15.00 






























REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: VIDEO TAPE COPY 
Amount Due: 15.00 
Amount Paid: 15.00 



















BAIL/CASH BOND DETAIL - TYPE: CASH BOND: Civil, Mi 
Posted By: DAVID BENNETT 
Posted: 300.00 
Forfeited: 0.00 
nted: 01/08/02 14:25:33 Page 5 





BAIL/CASH BOND DETAIL - TYPE: CASH BOND: 












.2-30-94 Judge MEDLEY assigned. 
.2-30-94 Fee Account created 
.2-30-94 COMPLAINT-NO AMT SPC 
Note: CV FILING 
.2-30-94 Note: FILED: COMPLAINT(JURY TRIAL REQUESTED) 
.2-30-94 Filed: Complaint 
31-21-95 Note: FILED: AMENDED COMPLAINT 
)l-27-95 Note: FILED: SUMMONS ON RETURN CHRISTOPHER L BURTON ESQ 
31-27-95 Note: FILED: SUMMONS ON RETURN LAW FIRM OF JONES, WALDO, 
HOLBROOK & 
)l-27-95 Note: MCDONOUGH 
)l-31-95 Note: FILED: NOTICE OF ORDERS AUTHORIZING COMPLAINT 
32-03-95 Note: FIELD: RULE 12(B) MOTION TO DISMISS AND MOTION TO STAY 
BRIEFING 
32-03-95 Note: AND HEARING ON 12(B) MOTION TO DISMISS 
32-03-95 Note: FILED: MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 12(B) MOTION TO DISMISS 
AND 





























COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 
PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS 
TO DISMISS AND STAY PROCEEDING-REQUEST FOR HEARING 
TRIAL SOUGHT) 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND-DELIVERY RE: PLAINTIFF'S 
IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS MOTIONS TO DISMISS AND 
STAY 
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!E NUMBER 940908220 {Civil} 
27-95 Note: AND MOTION TO STAY BRIEFING AND HEARING ON 12(B) 
MOTION anitag 
27-95 Note: TO DISMISS UNTIL AFTER RULING OF UNITED STATES 
DISTRICT anitag 
27-95 Note: COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA anitag 
06-95 Note: FILED: MINUTE ENTRY - COURT ORDERS DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
STAY susanh 
06-95 Note: BRIEFING AND MOTION TO DISMISS SET FOR ORAL 
ARGUMENT ON susanh 
06-95 Note: APRIL 10 AT 9 susanh 
06-95 ORAL ARGUMENTS scheduled on April 10, 1995 at 09:00 AM in 
Fourth Floor - W46 with Judge MEDLEY. susanh 
10-95 Note: FILED: MINUTE ENTRY - DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO STAY BRIEFING 
IS susanh 
10-95 Note: GRANTED BY THE COURT susanh 
10-95 In-court Conference scheduled on June 05, 1995 at 04:00 PM in 
Fourth Floor - W4 6 with Judge MEDLEY. susanh 
10-95 Note: ICC scheduled for 06/05/95 at 1100 A in room A 
with TEM susanh 
26-95 Note: FILED: ORDER J 
MEDLEY susanh 
05-95 Note: FILED: MINUTE ENTRY - COURT ORDERS STAY TO REMAIN IN 
EFFECT AND susanh 
05-95 Note: COURT WILL REVIEW ORDER FROM FEDERAL COURT susanh 
27-95 Note: FILED: PLAINTIFFS NOTICE OF FILING DATE FOR SECOND 
AMENDED anitag 
27-95 Note: COMPLAINT anitag 
31-95 Note: FILED: TRANSCRIPT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTIONS susanh 
01-95 Note: FILED: PLAINTIFF'S SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT joycer 
01-95 Note: FILED: PLAINTIFF'S SECOND AMENDED COMPLAIANT joycer 
14-95 Note: FILED: RENEWAL OF RULE 12 (B) MOTION TO DISMISS AND 
MOTION TO joycer 
14-95 Note: STAY BRIEFING AND HEARING ON 12 (B) MOTION TO 
DISMISS joycer 
14-95 Note: FILED: MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF RENEWAL OF RULE 12(B) 
MOTION joycer 
14-95 Note: TO DISMISS AND MOTION TO STAY BRIEFING AND HEARING 
ON joycer 
14-95 Note: 12 (B) MOTION TO DISMISS joycer 
28-95 Note: FILED: PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO SCHEDULE STATUS CONFERENCE 
AND j oycer 
28-95 Note: REMOVE STAY; AND MOTION IN OPPOSITION TO 
DEFENDANTS' j oycer 
28-95 Note: SECOND MOTION TO STAY **REQUEST FOR HEARING**(JURYjoycer 
28-95 Note: TRIAL SOUGHT) joycer 
28-95 Note: FILED: CERTIFICATE OF MAILING RE: MOTION AND MEMORANDUM 
TO joycer 
28-95 Note: SCHEDULE STATUS CONFERENCE AND REMOVE STAY; AND 
MOTION IN joycer 
ited: 01/08/02 14:25:34 Page 7 
ASE NUMBER 940908220 {Civil} 
8-28-95 Note: OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' 2ND MOTION TO 
STAY**REQUEST 
8-28-95 Note: FOR HEARING**(JURY TRIAL SOUGHT) 
8-28-95 Note: FILED: PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO 
SCHEDULE 
8-28-95 Note: STATUS CONFERENCE AND REMOVE STAY; AND MOTION 
8-28-95 Note: OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' 2ND MOTION TO 
STAY**REQUEST 
IN 
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FOR HEARIN**(JURY TRIAL SOUGHT) 
PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO 
STATUS CONFERENCE AND REMOVE STAY; AND MOTION IN 
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' 2ND MOTION TO STAY 
FOR HEARING**(JURY TRIAL SOUGHT) 
TRANSCRIPT OF MOTION HEARING BEFORE THE HONORABLE 
KEEP, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
PLAINTIFF'S THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE (MOTION FOR ORDER AMENDING 
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT HEREIN, THIRD AMENDED 
AND (PROPOSED) ORDER ON DEFENDANTS) 
MOTION FOR ENTRY OF ORDER PERMITTING PLAINTIFF TO 
HIS SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT 
NOTICE OF SUBMISSION OF PLEADINGS IN CASE NO. 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 
DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 






















STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF 
CIVIL CASE NO. 90-1183-K 
s Motion to Lift Stay 
in Support of Pltf 
(POR) 
s Motion to Lift Stay 
Pltf's Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint 
Memo in Support of Pltf's Motion for Leave to Amend 
s Motion to Add Party Defts 
Memo in Support of Pltf's Motion to ADD Party Defts 
Certificate of Service 
Entry Of Appearance (James Barber atp) 
Affidavit of R Priya Sesharchari In Support 
for Leave to Amend Complaint 
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Filed: Plaintiff's Notice to Submit for Decision Motion to Lift 
Stay 
Filed: Stipulation 
Filed order: Order 
Judge tmedley 
Signed July 06, 1998 
Filed: Fourth Amended Complaint 
Filed: Acceptance of Service 
Filed: Motion for Leave to Effect Service upon Steve Carli by 
Publication and/or Mail 
Filed: Stipulation 
Filed: Application to File Overlength Memo in Support of Motion 
to Dismiss Pltf's Fourth Amended Complaint tinaa 
Filed: Deft's Motion to Dismiss Pltf's Fourth Amended Complainttinaa 
Filed: Memo in support of Defts' Motion to Dismiss Pltf's 
Fourth Amended Complaint (oral Argument Requested) tinaa 
Filed order: Order Granting Defts' Application to file 
Overlength memo tinaa 
Judge tmedley 
Signed September 14, 1998 
Filed: Summons on Return Served to Post Kirby Noonan & Sweat by 
leaving with Michael Kirby tinaa 
Filed: Summons on Return Served to Michael Kirby tinaa 
Filed: Affidavit of David D Bennett tinaa 
Filed: Post Kirby's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal 
Jurisdiction 
Filed: Ex Parte Application to file Overlength Memorandum in 
support of Post Kirby's Motion To Dismiss for Lack of Personal 
Jurisdiction 
Filed: Post Kirby's Memorandum in Support of Motuui "I ) Dismiss 
for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction 
Filed: Affidavit of Michael L Kirby in Support of Motion to 
Dismiss 
Filed order: Order Granting Ex Parte Application to File 
Overlength Memorandum in Suppot of Post Kirby's Motion to 
Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction 
tmedley 
December 04, 1998 
of David D. Bennett in Opposition to Motion to 
of in Personam Jurisdiction daleeng 
Filed: Memorandum in Opposition to Post Kirby's Motion to 
Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction 











Opposition to Post Kirby's Motion to Dismiss daleeng 
L4-99 Fee Account created Total Due: 1.0 0 betsyc 
L4-99 COPY FEE Payment Received: 1.00 betsyc 
L9-99 Filed: Amended Affidavit of David Bennett in Opposition to 
Motion to Dismiss tinaa 
L9-99 Filed: Ex Parte Application to File Overlength Memo in 
lted: 01/08/02 14:25:35 Page 9 
\SE NUMBER 940908220 {Civil} 
Opposition to Jones Waldo's Motion to Dismiss tinaa 
L-19-99 Filed: Memo In opposition to Motion to Dismiss (Oral Argument 
Requested) tinaa 
2-01-99 Fee Account created Total Due: 1.00 eileend 
2-01-99 COPY FEE Payment Received: 1.00 eileend 
2-09-99 Filed: Motion for Leave to Withdraw as Co-Counsel for Plaintiffdaleeng 
2-16-99 Fee Account created Total Due: 1.25 julienat 
2-16-99 COPY FEE Payment Received: 1.25 julienal 
3-26-99 Filed: Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss of 
Defendants' Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough, Christopher 
Burton, Sidney Baucom and James Lowrie daleeng 
4-22-99 Filed: Post Kirby's Request to File an Overlength Reply 
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal 
Jurisdiction 
4-23-99 Filed: Notice to Submit for Decision Post Kirby's Motion to 
Dismiss for lack of Personal Jurisdiction and Request for Oral 
Argument 
4-26-99 Filed order: Order for Overlength Reply Memorandum in Support 
of Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction 
Judge tmedley 
Signed April 26, 1999 
4-26-99 Filed: Post Kirby's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to 
Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction 
5-21-99 Filed: Notice to Submit for Decision and Motion to Set Hearing 
Date for Oral Argument on Motions 
5-25-99 Fee Account created Total Due: 1.25 
5-25-99 COPY FEE Payment Received: 1.25 
6-09-99 Notice - NOTICE for Case 940908220 ID 356419 
ORAL ARGUMENT is scheduled. 
Date: 08/30/1999 
Time: 09:00 a.m. 
Location: Fourth Floor - W46 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
45 0 SOUTH STATE 
SLC, UT 84111-1860 
Before Judge: TYRONE E. MEDLEY 
This case is set for 2 hours oral argument on Jonesf Waldo, 
Holbrook & McDonough's Motion to Dismiss and Post, Noonan, Kirby & 
Sweat's Motion to Dismiss. 
)6-09-99 ORAL ARGUMENT scheduled on August 30, 1999 at 09:00 AM in 
Fourth Floor - W46 with Judge MEDLEY. daleenc 
36-22-99 Filed: Supplemental Authority in Opposition to Motions to 
Dismiss (oral Argument Requested) tinaa 
38-20-99 Notice - NOTICE for Case 940908220 ID 405872 daleenc 
ORAL ARGUMENT. 
Date: 10/25/1999 
Time: 09:00 a.m. 
Location: Fourth Floor - W46 
Printed: 01/08/02 14:25:39 Page 10 
E NUMBER 940908220 {Civil} 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
450 SOUTH STATE 
SLC, UT 84111-1860 
Before Judge: TYRONE E. MEDLEY 
The reason for the change is Conflict in Judge Schedule 
Jones, Waldo's Motion to Dismiss & Post, Kirby's Motion to Dismiss 
set for 08-30-99 is continued. 
20-99 ORAL ARGUMENT rescheduled on October 25, ] c ^ at O'MOO AM 
Reason: Conflict in Judge Schedule. daleeng 
25-99 Minute Entry - Minutes for ORAL ARGUMENT daleeng 






RUTHI PRIYA SESHACHARI 
JAMES N. BARBER 
RICK B HOGGARD 





TIME: 9:07 AM Post, Kirby's Motion to Dismiss 
TIME: 9:35 AM Argument. (James Barber) 
TIME: 9:58 AM Argument. (James Jardine) 
TIME: 10:05 AM The Court takes the matter of the Court's 
Decision under advisement. 
Jones, Waldo's Motion to Dismiss. (R. Brent Stephens) 
TIME: 10:28 AM Argument. (R. Priya Seshachari) 
TIME: 10:45 AM Argument. (R. Brent Stephens) 
TIME: 10:52 AM The Court takes the matter of the Court 
decision under advisement. 
15-99 Fee Account created Total Due: 
!5-99 COPY FEE Payment Received: 
17-99 Fee Account created Total Due: 
>7-99 COPY FEE Payment Received: 
3-99 Filed: Notice and Stipulation Regarding Filing of Recons 
Volume of Court Record 
6-99 Filed order: Ex Parte Motion l.oi. Order Regarding Reconst 
Volume II of Court File 
Judge tmedley 
Signed December 16, 1999 
5-00 Fee Account created Total Due: f oo 
5-00 COPY FEE Payment Received: 
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1-07-00 Filed order: Minute Entry - Post Kirby's Motion to 
Lack of Personal Jurisdiction is granted (see file 
ruling) 
Judge tmedley 
Signed January 07, 2000 
Fee Account created Total Due: 2.00 
COPY FEE Payment Received: 
Filed: Notice of Pltfs Objections to A Minute Entry 
Proposed Order 
Filed: Post Kirby's Response to Bennett's Notice of Objections 
to A Minute Entry and proposed Order 
Filed order: Minute Entry - Jones Waldo's Motion to Dismiss is 
granted (see file for complete ruling) 
Judge tmedley 
Signed February 11, 2 000 
2-11-00 Filed order: Rule 54(b) Judgment on all Claims Against 
Defendants Post Kirby Noonan & Sweat Michael Kirby and Michael 
L. Kirby Individually 
Judge tmedley 
Signed February 11 
(2-11-00 Case Disposition is Dismissed 
Disposition Judge is TYRONE E. MEDLEY 
12-16-00 Filed: Reply of Pltf In Support of His Notice of Objections to 
A Minute Entry and Proposed Order 
)2-17-00 Filed: Notice to Submit for Signature the 
Judgment on all Claims Against Defendants 
Sweat and Michael L. Kirby 
)2-28-00 Filed order: Rule 54(b) Judgment on all Claims Against 
Defendants Post Kirby Noonan & Sweat, and Michael Kirby 
Judge tmedley 
Signed February 28, 2000 
)3-16-00 Fee Account created Total Due: 
33-16-00 COPY FEE Payment Received: 
)5-10-00 Fee Account created Total Due: 
35-10-00 COPY FEE Payment Received: 
D5-10-00 Filed: Notice of Entry of Judgment 
D5-11-00 Fee Account created Total Due: 
35-11-00 COPY FEE Payment Received: 
35-11-00 Fee Account created Total Due: 
35-11-00 COPY FEE Payment Received: 
05-22-00 Fee Account created Total Due: 
05-22-00 COPY FEE Payment Received: 2.25 
05-26-00 Filed: Memo in Support of Motion to The Court Under Rule 60 to 
Strike A February 28th 2000 Ruling and to Decide A Timely Rule 
59 Motion (hearing requested) 
05-26-00 Filed: Motion to The Court Under Rule 60 th Strike A February 
28th 2000 Ruling and To Decide upon A Timely filed Rule 59 
Motion 
06-07-00 Filed: Post Kirby's Memo in Opposition to Pltf's Rule 60 Motiontinaa 
Proposed Rule 54(v) 
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Filed: Notice of Appeal mckaem 
Fee Account created Total Due: 19 0.00 mckaem 
APPEAL Payment Received: 190.00 mckaem 
Note: Code Description: APPEAL 
Note: Forwarded Cert/Copy of Notice of Appeal of Final Order to 
Supreme Court 
Fee Account created Total Due: 2,50 
COPY FEE Payment Received: 2.50 
Filed: Letter from Supreme Court (Noa received, Supreme Court 
No. 20000518-sc) 
Filed: Notice to Submit for Decision 
Filed: Reply in Support of Pltf's Motion to the court Under 
Rule 60 to Strike A February 28th 2000 Ruling and to Decide 
upon a Timely Filed Rule 59 Motion 
Fee Account created Total Due: 5.25 
COPY FEE Payment Received: 5.25 
Notice - NOTICE for Case 940908220 ID 655698 
ORAL ARGUMENT is scheduled. 
Date: 10/02/2000 
Time: 02:00 p.m. 
Location: Fourth Floor - W46 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
450 SOUTH STATE 
SLC, UT 84111-1860 










This case is set for 2 hour oral argument on Plaintiff's Motion 
Rule 60 and to Decide upon Rule 59 Motion. 
08-00 ORAL ARGUMENT scheduled on October 02, 2000 at 02:00 PM in 
Fourth Floor - W46 with Judge MEDLEY. 
07-00 Filed: Response to Objection to Proposed Order 
08-00 Filed: Notice to Submit and Request for Ruling 
14-00 Fee Account created Total Due: 0.75 
14-00 COPY FEE Payment Received: 0.75 
27-00 Filed: Note: notice to submit submitted to Judge (9.7.0) 
29-00 Filed: Notice of Entry of Appearance of Counsel for Plaintiff 
David D. Bennett (Daniel Moquin) 
02-00 Note: Defendant paid by check #2526 
02-00 Fee Account created Total Due: 15.00 
02-00 VIDEO TAPE COPY Payment Received: 15.00 
02-00 Minute Entry - Minutes for ORAL ARGUMENT 















Plaintiff's Attorney(s): JAMES N. BARBER 
DANIEL G. MOQUIN 
PRIYA S. SANGER 
Defendant's Attorney(s): RICK B HOGGARD 
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ASE NUMBER 940908220 {Civil} 
R. BRENT STEPHENS 
Video 
HEARING 
TIME: 2:40 PM Argument. 
TIME: 2:52 PM Argument. 
TIME: 3:04 PM Argument. 
TIME: 3:07 PM Argument. 
TIME: 2:02 PM Plaintiff's Motion for Rule 60 and to Decide Rule 





TIME: 3:09 PM The Court takes the matter of the Court's decision 
under advisement. 
TELEPHONE CONFERENCE/RULING is scheduled. 
Date: 10/06/2000 
Time: 08:15 a.m. 
Fourth Floor - W46 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
450 SOUTH STATE 
SLC, UT 84111-1860 
TYRONE E. MEDLEY 
0-02-00 TELEPHONE CONFERENCE/RULING scheduled on October 06, 2000 at 
08:15 AM in Fourth Floor - W46 with Judge MEDLEY. daleeng 
0-06-00 Filed: Letter objection dated 08-31-00 daleeng 
0-06-00 Filed order: Order of Dismissal with Prejudice as to Defendants 
Jones Waldo Holbrook & McDonough, Christopher Burton, Sidney 
Baucom and James Lowrie daleeng 
Judge tmedley 
Signed October 06, 2000 
.0-06-00 Filed: Notice by Plaintiff of Summary Document Presented at 
Hearing daleeng 
.0-06-00 Minute Entry - Minutes for TELEPHONE CONFERENCE/RULING daleeng 





Plaintiff's Attorney(s): JAMES N. BARBER 
PRIYA S. SANGER 
Defendant's Attorney(s): RICK B HOGGARD 
R. BRENT STEPHENS 
Video 
HEARING 
TIME: 8:28 AM Ruling - Plaintiff's Motion for Rule 60 is denied. 
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Rick Hoggard to prepare the order 
The letter objection filed 08-31-00 and the proposed order 













Filed: Notice to the Court of A Clarification 
created 
2 0 - 0 0 
2 2 - 0 0 
2 6 - 0 0 
2 6 - 0 0 
2 6 - 0 0 
2 6 - 0 0 
2 6 - 0 0 
2 6 - 0 0 
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3 1 - 0 0 
3 1 - 0 0 
3 1 - 0 0 
3 1 - 0 0 
3 1 - 0 0 
3 1 - 0 0 
3 1 - 0 0 
3 1 - 0 0 
0 1 - 0 0 
Fee Account 
COPY FEE 
Note: Mail Payment 
Fee Account created 















Total Due: 1.50 
Total Due: 2.00 
Payment Received: 1.50 
Payment Received: 2.00 
Notice of Objections to Proposed Order 
Supreme Court Notice of Decision - See attached order 
- Defendant's 
(SC # 20000518-SC) 
Filed: Supreme Court Order (SC # 20000518-SC) 
motion to appeal granted. 
Filed: Notice of Entry of Judgment 
Fee Account created Total Due: 
COPY FEE Payment Received: 
Fee Account created Total Due: 
COPY FEE Payment Received: 
Filed: Post Kirby's Repsonse to Notice of 
Proposed Order 
Filed: Notice of Withdrawal of Priya S. Sc 
Filed: Notice of Appeal 
Fee Account created Total Due: 
APPEAL Payment Received: 
Note: Code Description: APPEAL 
Fee Account created Total Due: 
COPY FEE Payment Received: 
Fee Account created Total Due: 
VIDEO TAPE COPY Payment Received: 
Filed: Notice of Utah Supreme Court Ruling Contrary to the 




































01-00 Note: Cert, copy of Notice of Appeal forwarded to Supreme Courtkathys 
03-00 Filed: Notice of Filing of Bond for Costs on Appeal 
03-00 Bond Account created Total Due: 
03-00 Bond Posted Payment Received: 
03-00 Filed: Letter from Supreme Court (Noa received, 
No. 20000938-sc) 
07-00 Fee Account created Total Due: 
37-00 COPY FEE Payment Received: 
13-00 Fee Account created Total Due: 
13-00 COPY FEE Payment Received: 
L5-00 Filed: Motion Re Second Request for Status 
L5-00 Filed: Memo in support of Pltf's Motion Re 
Status conference (Hearing Requested) 
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ASE NUMBER 940908220 {Civil} 
Supreme Court Entered October 25, 2000 daleeng 
1-17-00 Filed: Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion That This 
Court Act Pursuant to Order of the Utah Supreme Court Entered 
October 25, 2000 daleeng 
1-17-00 Filed: Attachments to Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's 
Motion That This Court Act Pursuant to Order of the Utah 
Supreme Court Entered October 25, 2000 daleeng 
1-22-00 Filed: Post Kirby's Response to Bennett's Pending Filings and 
Request That The Court Enter Proposed Order daleeng 
1-27-00 Fee Account created Total Due: 6.50 betsyc 
1-27-00 COPY FEE Payment Received: 6.50 betsyc 
2-01-00 Filed: Transcript of hearing 10-6-00 sharonb 
2-01-00 Filed: Transcript of hearing 10-25-99 sharonb 
2-04-00 Filed: Letter from Daniel Moquin daleeng 
2-04-00 Minute Entry - MINUTE ENTRY daleeng 
Judge: TYRONE E. MEDLEY 
Clerk: daleeng 
Based upon the stipulated letter filed with the Court on November 
30, 2000, the Court will take no further action on the proposed 
Order filed on November 22, 2000. The Court further reserves 
ruling on plaintiff's request for a status conference until the 
objections to the November 22, 2000 Order have been resolved. 
Judge TYRONE E. MEDLEY 
.2-04-00 Filed: Reply In Support of Plaintiff's Motion That This Court 
Act Pursuant to Order of the Utah Supreme Court Entered October 
25, 2000 daleeng 
.2-07-00 Filed: Notice to Submit for Decision tinaa 
L2-07-00 Filed: Notice to Submit for Decision tinaa 
L2-11-00 Tracking started for Accounting. Review date Dec 11, 2001. cindyn 
L2-15-00 Minute Entry - Minutes for TELEPHONE CONFERENCE daleeng 




Plaintiff's Attorney(s): DANIEL G. MOQUIN 
Defendant's Attorney(s): RICK B HOGGARD 
R. BRENT STEPHENS 
HEARING 
Dan Moquin to send notice of hearing, 
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E NUMBER 940908220 {Civil} 
MOTION HEARING is scheduled. 
Date: 01/31/2001 
Time: 01:30 p.m. 
Location: Fourth Floor - W46 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
450 SOUTH STATE 
SLC, UT 84111-1860 
Before Judge: TYRONE E. MEDLEY 
15-00 MOTION HEARING scheduled on January 31, 2001 at 01:30 PM in 
Fourth Floor - W46 with Judge MEDLEY. 
29-00 Filed: Notice of Oral Argument 
24-01 MOTION HEARING scheduled on February 21, 2001 at 09:00 AM in 
Fourth Floor - W46 with Judge MEDLEY. 
24-01 Minute Entry - Law & Motion continued 







The Court has made a motion for continuance of Law & Motion. 
The motion is granted. 
The Motion Hearing set for January 31, 2001 is continued to 
February 21, 2 001. Judge Medley is out of town on family matters. 
MOTION HEARING is scheduled. 
Date: 02/21/2001 
Time: 09:00 a.m. 
Location: Fourth Floor - W46 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
450 SOUTH STATE 
SLC, UT 84111-1860 
Before Judge: TYRONE E. MEDLEY 
24-01 ORAL ARGUMENT Continued. 
D5-01 Note: INDEXED: CERT. COPY OF INDEX FORWARDED TO SUPREME COURT kathys 
20-01 Fee Account created Total Due: 15.00 joycer 
20-01 VIDEO TAPE COPY Payment Received: 15.00 joycer 
21-01 Minute Entry - Minutes for ORAL ARGUMENT tinaa 
Judge: TYRONE E. MEDLEY 
Clerk: tinaa 
PRESENT 
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): JAMES N. BARBER 
DANIEL G. MOQUIN 
Defendant's Attorney(s): RICK B HOGGARD 
Video 
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- 0 1 
The Court will draft an Order on the ruling, counsel to receive 
copy with in one week. 
Filed: Notice of Order Issued 2/23/01 By Utah Supreme Court kimbers 
Filed order: Order Denying Outstanding Motions kimbers 
Judge tmedley 
Signed February 28, 2001 
Bond Account created Total Due: 300.00 juliec 
Bond Posted Payment Received: 300.00 juliec 
Filed: Notice of Appeal juliec 
Fee Account created Total Due: 190.00 juliec 
APPEAL Payment Received: 19 0.00 juliec 
Note: Code Description: APPEAL 
33-28-01 Note: Cert/copies of Notice of Appeal and Notice of Filing of 
Bond for Costs on Appeal sent to Supreme Court susanc 
34-03-01 Filed: Letter from Supreme Court (Noa received, Supreme Court 
No. 20010296-sc) sophiec 
01 Filed: Letter from Daniel G. Moquin Attorney at Law kimbers 
01 Filed: Notice of Filing of Transcript kathys 
01 Filed: Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings: Motions on 
10/02/00 kathys 
01 Filed: Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings: Motion on 02/2l/01kathys 
01 Note: Cert, copy of Index forwarded to Supreme Court kathys 
01 Tracking ended for Accounting. cindyi 
01 Fee Account created Total Due: 0.25 shelly] 
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Tab 4 
M E M O R A N D U M 
TO: Litigation Committee A 
FROM: Sidney G. Baucom A^Lr 
DATE: January 22, 1990^-^ 
RE: Basic Claims of Bennett v. Gen-Probe 
BASIC CLAIMS OF BENNETT v. GEN-PROBE 
(U.S- Dist. Ct. for Utah 89-C-1074G) 
Class and derivative claims are pleaded on behalf of 
holders of common stock of Gen-Probe, Incorporated, as 
constituted on October 27, 1989, the day before the directors 
approved a Merger Agreement between Gen-Probe and Cl/ugai. 
Excluded from the plaintiff class are the named defendants, 
their "affiliates" and insiders all of whom hold "restricted" 
securities (as these terms are defined in SEC Rules and 
Regulations)• Including "fully diluted" shares, meaning 
options, warrants, and shares that were not vested except by 
the terms of the Merger, the defendants and affiliates 
controlled nearly 85% of all outstanding stock (approximately 
15 million restricted shares); plaintiffs held about 2.6 
million shares of registered, free-trading stock. 
The plaintiff class purchased their shares on a public 
offering September 30, 1987, for $7.00 a share (a total of $18 
Million), and subsequently at NASDAQ over-the-counter market 
prices ranging from a closing high of $8.75 to a closing low of 
about $3.00 a share. (The 15 million restricted shares were 
issued for a total risk-capital investment in the Company of 
probably well under $15 million.) 
The Company claimed that it had "started a revolution 
in chemical microbiology"/ [1987 Annual Report]/ but that 
"others may receive patents which contain claims applicable to 
the Companyfs products." [Prospectus/ page 5]. The Company 
further warned that while it had "applied for patents covering 
certain aspects of its technology/ no assurance can be given 
that any patents will be issued or, if issued/ that the scope 
of any patent protection would be significant." 
Less than two years after the public offering/ and 
within six weeks of the granting of a revolutionary genetic 
probe patent to Gen-Probe (the Kohne patent)/ Gen-Probefs 
president (and all directors ultimately concurred) sought a 
takeover by Chugai. Indeed/ a month before the patent was 
granted (but probably knowing ^t^would be its likely scope) , 
Gen-Probe engaged Merrill Lynch to consult relative to the 
Merger and Acquisition. (See Complaint/ paragraphs 38-48). A 
"definitive" merger agreement was quickly concluded and 
implemented in maximum haste under the 90% "short form" 
Delaware statute. Gen-Probe directors agreed to aid Chugai in 
-2-
urging public stockholders to accept a tender offer price of 
$6.25 a share (resulting in a permanent loss for most). Every 
director realized a seemingly unconscionable/ quick profit on 
restricted shares he held, in most cases amounting to millions 
on a negligible actual casfe investment. Directors and 
affiliates purchased stock for as little as $.01, $.05 and $.18 
a share. All stockholders except Chugai were "frozen-out" of 
ownership. 
I* Plaintiffs seek rescissory and punitive damages 
for breaches by the directors of fiduciary duties, and a 
concept of constructive trust might be applied. A summary of 
those breaches is in paragraph 78 of the Complaint at pages 
35-40, stated against the President, Thomas Bologna. 
II. Plaintiffs seek damages under federal securities 
acts and regulations, summarized in paragraph 88, pages 43-45. 
III. Plaintiffs similarly seek damages, and attorneys 
fees, against the directors for violation of the Utah Uniform 
Securities Act. 
Under the high standards set by recent Delaware cases 
(perhaps compensating for what could otherwise be 
stockholder-oppressive/director-favorable statutes) the 
directors breached their fiduciary duties to the public 
minority shareholders. Significant punitive damages or an 
equitable remedy in the nature of a constructive trust seems 
warranted. 
-3-
The Kohne patent/ which is a pioneering breakthrough 
from all prior art (i.e., an extraordinary patent grant) and 
which protects all of Gen-Probe*s present product lines is 
significant scientifically and financially. In addition to all 
other contentions/ Plaintiffs assert that the patent and its 
value were not.adequately factored into the Merrill Lynch "fair 
price" report. The Kohne patent/ possibly now the Company's 
greatest single intrinsic asset/ was not even mentioned in the 
tender offer proxy materials; and even Merrill Lynch and an 
affliate profited in self-interested ways from the Chugai 
deal: see Complaint/ paragraphs 68-70. 
PROBABILITY OF SUCCESS AND EXPECTANCY 
Attached is a summary of law on certain relevant 
fq£ures of the case together with a Third Amended Complaint not 
yet filed. Applying the facts of Gen-Probe it is estimated 
that probability of success exceeds 50 percent. Verdict range 
should be $50 million to $100 million. 
FEES AND COSTS 
It is proposed that the Firm take the case on a 
straight contingency basis and forward all costs. Contingency 
would be one-third and forty-five percent if the case is 
appealed. I estimate that costs will be in a $200/000 range. 
-4-
Costs would be repaid with 300 percent premium with the overage 
to be deducted from fees before they are divided. 
It is proposed that Wallace Bennett devote his full 
time to the case if required and share fees in proportion to 
time spent as compared to that spent by the Firm, His 
involvement would greatly reduce required Firm manpower but 
would necessitate as a practical matter an assignment of office 
space for his use pending completion of the case, 
sgb3 6/djb / 
-5-
Tab 5 
ttOORY A. PC8T 
CWAEL l_ KIR1Y. A.P.C 
kVJO J . NCONAN 
CHARD W. SWEAT 
SHUCC WAYNC, A.P.C 
IQMAS W. *CTTVES 
kNORA L. LACKEY 
>93 J . BCHWA^TZ 
se N. WILOON 
'CPHANie SOKTAC 
1.VIO B. OSCRHOLTZER 
<ARL*S T. HOGE 
kTALlC C VCNEZIA 
P O S T KIRBY N O O N A N & SWEAT 
LAWYCHH 
WOO IMPERIAL BANK TOWER 
TOI S STREET 
SAN DIEGO, CA © 2 I O I - 8 I 0 3 
TELEPHONE (e i©) 2 3 1 - 6 6 0 6 
FACSIMILE (©I©) 2 3 1 - 0 8 8 3 
FACSIMILE (Gto) £ 3 l - 4 3 e O 
December 20, 1990 
OICKKAN A. SEMCRCVIA* 
JAMES O. PORTMAN 
C KZHHtTH PURVIANCC 
JEFFREY A. HAILC 
JAMCS ft. LANCC 
STEVEN W. 6ANCHCC 
Q. PATRICK CONNOR* III 
THKRCSA M. BRCNL 
JEFFREY P. LCNDWUM 
CMNCST E. WIDCMAN 
1046-1978 
Timothy C. Houpt, Esq. 
Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough 
170 South Main street, suite 1500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Re: Bennett v. Bologna 
Dear Tim: 
Enclosed is a copy of the Stipulated Order which has now 
been signed* by all counsel. Robin Werner called me on 
Wednesday and indicated that they were not inclined to sign 
the Order unless we stipulated to (1) dismiss the derivative 
claims, and (2) dismiss the Utah pendent law claims. I told 
her that I would not commit to doing so under any 
circumstances. I also told her that if they did not sign 
the Stipulated Order, I would make the ex parte application 
to Judge Gilliam. After she and her cohorts deliberated for 
a day, the Stipulated order was signed, as you can see. 
My plans are to arrive in Park City on December 27 and I 
will be there through January 5. I would like to spend a 
full day or two during that period meeting with you. Please 
check your schedules and let me know what days would be best 
to meet with you. 
Best regards, 
Michael L« Kirby 
of 
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United States District Court, N.D Illinois, Eastern 
Division 
INTERCLAIM HOLDINGS LIMITED, Plaintiff, 
v 
NESS, MOTLEY, LOADHOLT, RICHARDSON 
AND POOLE, Defendant. 
No. 00 C 7620. 
Oct. 29, 2001. 
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 
PALLMEYER, District J. 
*1 In late 1999 and early 2000, Interclaim Holdings 
Limited and Interclaim Recovery Limited 
("Interclaim") retamed the law firm of Ness, Motley, 
Loadholt, Richardson & Poole ("Ness Motley") as its 
counsel to bring class action proceedings on behalf of 
victims of a complex criminal network run by James 
Blair Down and others (hereinafter "Down" or 
"Down Group") Without notice to or consent from 
Interclaim, Ness Motley initiated settlement talks with 
Down and, on demand from Down, excluded 
Interclaim from participation in the talks or any 
recovery. Ness Motley officially terminated the 
attorney- client relationship with Interclaim m 
September of 2000, citing Down's demand that 
Interclaim be excluded from any settlement 
discussions as creating a conflict of mterest precluding 
Ness Motley's continued representation of Interclaim 
In its lawsuit, Interclaim alleges that Ness Motley 
breached its fiduciary duty to Interclaim, 
misappropriated confidential information, and 
breached the retamer agreement between the parties 
Now before the court is Defendant Ness Motley's 
motion to dismiss Interclaim's amended complaint for 
failure to state a claim. For the reasons stated herein, 
the motion to dismiss is denied. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
To understand Plaintiff's claims, the court reviews 
the complaint m some detail, accepting Plaintiff s 
allegations as true for purpose of tins motion From 
1989 to 1998, James Blair Down and others operated 
a complex network of associated corporations based in 
Canada and Barbados ("criminal enterprise") 
(Complaint 1 6 ) Through this network, Down 
engaged m the illegal use of mass mail solicitation and 
telemarketing to sell shares or other interests in large 
pools of foreign and domestic lottery tickets and other 
contests Down directed the solicitations to elderly 
citizens or others in declining mental or physical 
health. (Id.) An estimated one million individuals paid 
more than $200 million to the criminal enterprise, 
which funds were transferred to foreign and domestic 
bank accounts to be laundered and mvested around the 
world. (Id.) 
The Down Group is no stranger to the law Canadian 
and American officials investigated the criminal 
enterprise and as early as 1989, Canadian officials 
enjoined it from selling interests m lottery tickets 
because the contracts used to effectuate the sales 
constituted unregistered securities (Id If 7.) In 1997, 
the U S Postal Inspection Service and U.S Attorney 
brought a federal civil enforcement action agamst the 
enterprise in New Jersey (Id ) That same year, the 
Illinois Attorney General's office brought a consumer 
fraud action against one of the Barbados offshore 
associated entities of the criminal enterprise (Id.) The 
U.S. Attorney in Seattle also commenced asset 
forfeiture proceedmgs agamst $12.3 million of 
Down's illicit proceeds. Members of the Down Group 
pleaded guilty to criminal charges brought by the U.S 
Attorney in Seattle in 1998, and were enjoined from 
operating their schemes (Id ) 
*2 Plaintiff Interclaim acquires and enforces 
complex, multi-junsdictional liquidated claims, 
judgments, or debts, paying the owners of such claims 
cash or a contingent amount payable upon successful 
enforcement. (Id 1 8 ) Interclaim then dedicates 
resources necessary to investigate and enforce die 
claims, (Id.) In June of 1998, after being contacted by 
the Miami office of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, Interclaim agreed to help recover the 
monies lost by hundreds of thousands of U S. citizens 
to the Down Group's enterprise (Id. H 9 ) Interclaim 
successfully identified an estimated $100 million of 
laundered proceeds in more than fifteen countries (Id 
) Between October and December 1998, Interclaim 
entered into power of attorney agreements with 
sixteen of the Down Group's victims. (Id. K 10 ) The 
agreements authorized Interclaim to prosecute the 
victims' claims and recover monies obtained illegally 
(Id.) The agreements specifically provided that the 
"Claim owner appomts Interclaim to be the attorney-
in-fact tor Claim owner, with plenary authority to 
prosecute the Claim as it deems best, and for the 
purpose ot instructing counsel, causing suits to be 
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filed to enforce the claim and to take whatever other 
action whatsoever it seems needful to enforce the 
claim." (Power of Attorney Agreement, Ex. A to 
Complaint, ^ 7 ) 
In October and November of 1998, Interclaim 
purchased approximately $670,000 of outstanding 
trade debt owed by the Down Group to a data 
processmg and mass mailing company, a printing 
company, and a telephone company (Complamt f 
11.) Through this purchase, Interclaim acquired an 
electronic list of 418,256 names and addresses of 
victims of the criminal enterprise, providmg a detailed 
account of the Down Group's misdeeds durmg late 
1997 and early 1998. (Id.) 
Interclaim eventually retained Canadian law firms to 
commence involuntary bankruptcy proceedings against 
die Down Group in Vancouver, British Columbia and 
Calgary, Alberta In 1998, Interclaim filed the 
bankruptcy petitions on behalf of the 16 individuals 
for whom Interclaim held power of attorney 
agreements and all other victims of the criminal 
enterprise (Id Tf 12) At Interclaim's request, the 
court appointed Arthur Anderson, Inc ("Anderson") 
as interim receiver and approved an International 
Claims Enforcement Agreement between Interclaim 
and Anderson (Id. 1 13 ) Under that agreement, 
Interclaun was committed to fund the operations of 
Anderson with up to $3 million of cash and bonds and 
also to provide Anderson with expert and specialized 
services in identifying, locating, and recovering the 
illicit proceeds worldwide. (Id.) In return, Interclaim 
would receive a return of its direct costs up to $2 
million, plus fifty percent of any assets recovered in 
the bankruptcy up to a maximum of fifty percent of 
the proven claims of creditors (Id.) Through their 
joint efforts in seven jurisdictions in December of 
1998 and January of 1999, Interclaim and Anderson 
successfully preserved tens of millions of dollars of 
the Down Group's assets worldwide with an estimated 
net worth of $50 to $60 million. (Id. 1 14.) In June to 
August of 1999, Interclaim also received powers of 
attorney from 13 additional victims bringing the total 
victims, directly represented by Interclaun to 29. (Id. 
1115) 
*3 Things did not go well in the Canadian courts. In 
August of 1999, the bankruptcy proceedmgs were 
dismissed on the basis that the powers of attorney and 
trade debt purchase agreements violated the English 
common law doctrine against champerty, though the 
Bankruptcy Court mvited the appellate court to revisit 
the ancient law [FN1] In November 1999, the 
Alberta court struck die class action portion of 
Interclaim's representative proceeding on grounds that 
Alberta lacks a class action procedure (Id % 17 ) In 
January 2000, the Alberta court drastically reduced 
the amount of the Down Group's frozen assets 
concerning the representative proceedmg but 
maintained the asset preservation power of Anderson 
with respect to the other pending bankruptcy 
proceedmg (Id) 
FN1 Dismissal of the case on the champerty ground 
was ultimately reversed on appeal in January 2001 
but the immediate effect of the ruling jeopardized the 
likelihood of recovering illegally obtained monies 
from the Down Group (Complaint 1 16 ) 
In the face of tiiese setbacks, Interclaim decided to 
explore new avenues of recovery against the Down 
Group on behalf of Interdaun, Interclaim's 29 
represented victims, and the victual class generally ( 
Id 1f 18.) Interclaim determined to commence class 
action proceedmgs in the United State with the anns 
of (1) getting a judgment from an American court, (2) 
filing that judgment with the British Columbia 
bankruptcy court as an enforceable debt, thereby 
facilitating the liquidation of Down's assets for the 
benefit of the bankruptcy esiate, (3) securing the 
victim class members' dividend share from the 
bankruptcy court, and (4) returning dns dividend to 
the American court for dispensation to the victim 
class (Id.) 
To carry out this plan, Interclaun retained Ness 
Motley and directed the firm to bring class action 
proceedmgs on behalf of the victims of the criminal 
enterprise (Id H 19.) Interclaim and Ness Motley 
enacted a retainer agreement on February 14, 2000, 
whereby Interclaim retained Ness Motley "as its 
counsel, in both its capacity as (a) an owner of certain 
trade indebtedness owed by the Criminal Enterprise 
and (b) as a representative of [29] nominated victims 
of such enterprise (by and through certain Powers of 
Attorney) in respect of the pursuit of recovery of loss 
and damages occasioned to such persons, if any, by 
reason of the operation of the Criminal Enterprise." ( 
Id., Retainer Agreement, Ex. B to the Complaint 
(hereinafter "Agreement") § E.) The agreement also 
provided that, "prior to filing any document or 
pleading, or disclosing any information m connection 
with the U S Legal Proceedmgs, [Ness Motley] shall 
first review such filing with Interclaim's Canadian 
counsel." (Agreement § 8 0.) Ness Motley's 
obligations under the retainer agreement were to 
Copr. © West 2002 No Claim to Ong. U.S. Govt. Works 
Slip Copy 
(Cite as: 2001 WL 1313799, *3 (N.D.DUL)) 
Page 3 
commence legal proceedings m whatever U.S. 
jurisdiction (or jurisdictions) that is considers 
appropriate, as against Down, his apparent co-
conspirators and, to the extent that it considers 
appropriate, others, (the U.S Legal 
Proceedmgs) to seek a final money judgment as 
against Down, his co- conspirators (and 
possible others) for the liquidated value of the 
outstanding financial loss and/or damages 
suffered by the hiterclaim Victims and all other 
victims of the Criminal Enterprise, through the 
institution of class action proceedmgs. Ness 
Motley agrees to prosecute such U.S. Legal 
Proceedmgs in the ordinary court and to final 
end. 
*4 (Agreement § 2.0.) 
The Agreement also required Ness Motley to "keep 
all documents and information provided to it by 
Interclaun in confidence," and directed that 
communications between Ness Motley and Interclaun 
would, to the extent permitted by law, "be protected 
by attorney-client privilege." (Agreement § 7.0.) 
Notwithstanding this provision, the agreement 
authorized Ness Motley "to disclose confidential 
information conveyed to it by Interclaun to a court or 
courts in the Umted States in furtherance of the U.S. 
Legal Proceedmgs, as may be reasonably necessary." 
(Id.) 
The Agreement required Ness Motley to advance $1 
million to cover the cost of mailing notices to the 
members of the putative class. (Agreement § 3.0) 
The parties agreed that Ness Motley would receive 25 
percent of the net compensation paid to Interclaun out 
of the British Columbia bankruptcy estate. (Id. § 4 0 ) 
The amount paid to Ness Motley under this provision 
would be 12 5 percent of the value of the net assets 
recovered plus whatever compensation Ness Motley 
would have been entitled to in the U.S class action 
proceedmgs. (Complaint H 23.) 
Before finalizing the agreement, Ness Motley 
consulted an ethics expert to review the arrangement. 
(Id. U 24.) Plaintiff alleges that the expert recognized a 
possible conflict of mterest between hiterclaim, Ness 
Motley, and the putative class as to the reasonableness 
of the compensation to be paid to hiterclaim for 
services rendered on behalf of the class. (Id. t 24.) 
The parties drafted a provision to address that 
possibility, which required that before compensation 
is paid, "the U.S. class shall, at its own cost, retain 
special, independent outside counsel to represent the 
U.S. class of Down victims for the express purpose of 
independently evaluating the reasonableness of 
Interclaun's compensation." (Agreement § 4.0.) This 
clause did not, on its face, call for Ness Motley to 
withdraw representation of Interclaun in the event of a 
conflict (Complamt ^ 25.) 
Ness Motley selected Madison County, Illinois as the 
venue for the class action proceeding against the 
Down Group. (Id. 1 20.) Interclaun provided Ness 
Motiey with a confidential list of 344 individuals who 
resided in Madison County, and Ness Motley selected 
the named persons who would act as plaintiffs in the 
Madison County proceeding (Id.) Ness Motley filed 
the class action complamt on March 10, 2000 on 
behalf of these three individuals and all others 
similarly situated, that is, persons who had received 
"a solicitation to purchase an mterest in a game of 
chance or other offering from the Down Group," and 
had made such a purchase Interclaun contmued to 
provide confidential information to Ness Motley, 
including memoranda detailing the known evidence 
agamst the Down Group, copies of documents from a 
consumer fraud suit brought in 1997 by the Illinois 
Attorney General agamst a Down Group entity, legal 
memoranda prepared by Interclaun lawyers, and 
information regarding the nature, value, and location 
of the Down Group's assets. (Id. H 27.) 
*5 The British Columbia bankruptcy court set aside 
its appointment of Anderson on July 28, 2000 because 
Interclaun failed to present sufficient evidence that its 
liquidated claims for restitution were "debts" under 
the Canadian Bankruptcy Act. (Id. H 28.) The Court of 
Appeals granted a stay pendmg review, but Interclaun 
and Ness Motley were concerned that the stay might 
be lifted, thereby releasmg the frozen Down assets 
worldwide Accordingly, they sought and, on August 
7, 2000 obtained a TRO from the Circuit Court in 
Madison County which barred James Blair Down, 
Cindy Whitehead-Down, and two others from 
disposmg of or transferring any mterests they has in 
the assets previously frozen m the Canadian 
Bankruptcy proceeding. (Id.) 
On August 15, 2000 hiterclaim officials left for 
Madison County to attend a hearing on a motion to 
convert the TRO to a preliminary injunction. (Id. H 
29.) Upon arnvmg at the airport, Interclaun personnel 
learned that Ness Motley had, without notice or 
consent from Interclaun, initiated settlement talks with 
the Down Group and postponed the preliminary 
injunction hearmg. (Id. U 30.) Interclaun believes it 
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was at these pre-settlement talks that the Down Group 
insisted that Interclaim^ be excluded from any 
settlement. (Id.) Ness Motley did not disclose the 
nature of this potential conflict to Interclaim, nor did 
Ness Motley disclose the firm's mtention to accept 
Interclaim's exclusion as a term of any settlement 
agreement. (Id.) Ness Motley nevertheless continued 
to hold attorney-client meetmgs with Interclaim, 
thereby obtaining confidential information based on 
Interclaim's unique knowledge of the concealed 
ownership, location, and movement of the Down 
Groups' assets (Id. % 31.) During these meetmgs, 
Interclaim continued to provide Ness Motley with 
materials regarding the Down Group's lottery sales 
and money laundering activities, mcludmg (a) a chart 
identifying the financial institutions used by the Down 
Group, along with known account and transaction 
information specific to each institution, (b) a table of 
the Down Group's known assets, (c) a chart tracking 
the global movement of money, and (d) confidential 
written work product from a firm of forensic 
accountants in Canada, analyzing thousands of 
documents concerning the ownership and finance of 
the Down Group's Alberta real estate holdings. (Id.) 
On August 17, 2000, Ness Motley commenced 
settlement talks m Chicago with counsel for the Down 
Group Representatives from Ness Motley specifically 
asked Interclaim representatives not to attend the 
discussions but rather to remam m then hotel. (Id. If 
32 ) At a meeting later that day, Ness Motley 
representatives informed Interclaim representatives of 
a proposed settlement with the putative class in winch 
Down would pay $1 million in costs to notify the class 
of the settlement and establish a fund of approximately 
$10 million to pay approved class member claims 
along with Ness Motley's attorneys' fees. Any excess 
would revert back to Down (Id. H 33.) According to 
Interclaim, the proposed approval process for the 
Down victims, who were largely elderly or in 
declining mental or physical health, was 
extraordinarily difficult smce the victims were 
unlikely to have retained records of their payments to 
Down. (Id) Ness Motley reported that the Down 
Group expected very few claims to be established, 
with the result that bulk of the fund would revert to 
Down. (Id.) Nevertheless, Ness Motley's attorneys' 
fees were based on the value of the fond rather than 
the amount actually paid to class members. (Id.) 
*6 Interclaim representatives objected to the proposed 
terms as being grossly unfair to the class and 
detrimental to Interclaim. (Id. 1 34.) They noted then 
access to customer lists reflecting payments by victims 
m amounts exceeding $100 million (Id.) In light of 
these records, Interclaim alleges, Down's request that 
each victim to provide written proof of loss was 
unreasonably and unnecessary. (Id.) 
Ness Motley lawyers advised Interclaim that the 
Down Group had formally demanded, as a 
precondition to continuing the settlement talks, that 
Interclaim be excluded from any recovery and barred 
from any further knowledge oi the substantive content 
of the settlement talks. (Id. U 35.) Interclaim objected 
to tins demand, but Ness Motley responded that it 
would have to protect the class's mterest by accedmg 
to the Down Group's conditions (Id.) Ness Motley 
then continued discussions with the Down Group that 
afternoon and Interclaim believes settlement 
discussions have taken place elsewhere smce that 
date. (Id. 1 36.) 
On September 18, 2000, H Blair Hahn of Ness 
Motley sent a letter to Martin S. Kenney at Interclaim 
formalizing the firm's withdrawal from representation 
of Interclaim, a withdrawal winch Interclaim believes 
took place effectively on August 17 when Ness 
Motley repudiated its duties to Interclaim during the 
course of the initial settlement meeting (Id. H 38, 
Ness Motley Letter Ex. D ("Letter").) Hahn's letter 
asserted that m the event of a conflict between 
Interclaim and the class, Ness Motley was obligated 
to protect the class mterest, even at Interclaim* s 
expense. (Id. U 38; Letter.) The letter further stated 
that the proposed settlement, which excluded 
Interclaim from any settlement discussions and from 
any recovery, created a conflict of mterest precludmg 
Ness Motley from continumg lo represent Interclaim, 
but that Ness Motley would continue to represent the 
class. (Id. K 38; Letter.) Smce September 18, 2000, 
Ness Motiey has had no further contact with 
Interclaim and has not provided Interclaim with any 
other information regarding the status of settlement 
talks (Id. H 40.) 
On September 29, 2000, Ness Motley agreed to 
dismiss with prejudice Cindy Whitehead-Down from 
the Madison County proceeding. (Id. H 41 ) Interclaim 
beheves this dismissal will affect the preservation of 
assets subject to the Madison County TRO. Ness 
Motley informed Interclaim's Vancouver, Canada 
bankruptcy counsel that this dismissal was conditioned 
on freezing certain real estate assets, but Interclaim 
has seen no evidence of any asset freeze. (Id.) In fact, 
Interclaim alleges that six of the twelve remaining 
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frozen commercial assets had been sold as of March 
21, 2001 in apparent violation of the Madison County 
TR(T and the asserted consensual freeze of Cindy 
Whitehead- Down's property. (Id.) 
On December 4, 2001, Interclaim filed its original 
complaint against Ness Motley. Its amended 
complaint, filed on June 22, 2001, has three counts. 
In Count I, Interclaim alleges that Ness Motley owed 
it certain fiduciary duties arising from the attorney-
client relationship, including the duty of loyalty, 
honesty, and fidelity in representing Interclaim; the 
duty to discharge contractual obligations in good faith, 
the duty to preserve and protect confidential 
information; and the duty to not use confidential 
information in ways adverse to Interclaim. (Complaint 
Tf 44-46.) Interclaim claims that Ness Motley breached 
these duties by failing to keep Interclaim informed on 
all the activities of the class action proceeding, 
refusing requests to provide copies of motions and 
pleadings with Canadian counsel, unilaterally 
withdrawing from representation of Interclaim, 
agreeing to exclude Interclaim from sharing in any 
settlement, agreeing to exclude Interclaim -from 
participating in settlement talks, representing a second 
client in the same litigation after unilaterally dropping 
Interclaim as its client, revealing confidential 
information, and agreeing to dismiss a defendant to 
the detriment of Interclaim and the class. (Id. \ 47.) 
*7 In Count II, Interclaim alleges misappropriation of 
confidential information. Interclaim conducted an 
extensive investigation accumulating confidential 
information provided to Ness Motley pursuant to the 
Retainer Agreement. {Id. H 50.) Interclaim believes 
Ness Motley has used and continues to use this 
information in a manner contrary to the interests of 
Interclaim. (Id. \ 52 .) 
Finally, in Count IE, Interclaim alleges breach of the 
Retainer Agreement. Interclaim asserts that Ness 
Motley has materially breached its obligations under 
that Agreement by refusing to provide copies to 
Canadian counsel before filing, by agreeing to 
negotiate settlement on terms adverse to Interclaim, 
and by improperly and unilaterally terminating its 
representation of Interclaim. (Id. XI 55-58.) 
DISCUSSION 
Dismissal of a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) is proper 
only when no relief can be granted under any set of 
facts that can be proved consistent with the allegations 
of the complaint. Harris Trust & Sav. Bank v. E-II 
Holdings, Inc., 926 F.2d 636, 641 (7th Cir.1991). 
Written instruments that are attached to and referred 
to in the complaint may be considered on a motion to 
dismiss. See Levenstein v. Salafsky, 164 F.3d 345, 
347 (7th Cir.1998) (quoting Wright v. Associated Ins. 
Cos., 29 F.3d 1244, 1248 (7th Cir. 1994). Both parties 
here have referred to the specific provisions of the 
Retainer Agreement in support of their positions. 
Count I: Breach of Fiduciary Duty 
In general, in order to successfully assert breach of 
fiduciary duty, a plaintiff need only plead a fiduciary 
relationship and its breach. Young v. Colgate-
Palmolive Co., 790 F.2d 567, 570 (7th Cir. 1986) 
(citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 
874). Because the parties have not specifically 
identified what law will apply to this tort claim, the 
court considers both South Carolina and Illinois law. 
In South Carolina, an attorney is required to "render 
services with the degree of skill, care, knowledge, 
and judgment usually possessed and exercised by 
members of the profession." Holy Loch Distribs., Inc. 
v. Hitchcock, 340 S.C. 20, 26, 531 S.E.2d 282, 285 
(2000). South Carolina recognizes breach of fiduciary 
duty as a basis for both contract and tort claims. 
Under a tort theory, plaintiff must establish (1) a duty 
of care; (2) breach of that duty through act or 
omission; and (3) resulting injury. RJ. Hendricks v. 
Clemson University, 339 S.C. 552, 562, 529 S.E.2d 
293, 298 (S.C .CLApp. (2000). 
In Illinois, "a fiduciary relationship imposes a general 
duty on the fiduciary to refrain from seeking a selfish 
benefit during the relationship." Neade v. Fortes, 193 
I11.2d 433, 440, 737 N.E.2d 496, 500 (2000). As hi 
South Carolina, to successfully plead breach of 
fiduciary duty hi Illinois, the plaintiff must establish 
(1) existence of a fiduciary duty; (2) breach of that 
duty; and (3) resulting damages. Romanek v. 
Connelly, 324 Ill.App.3d 393, 447, 753 N.E.2d 1062, 
1072 (1st Dist.2001). 
*8 Ness Motley argues that Interclaim has not 
sufficiently pleaded a breach of fiduciary duty because 
the South Carolina Rules of Professional Conduct 
require Ness Motley to withdraw from representation 
of a client when such representation is in conflict with 
duties owed by another client. See South Carolina 
Rule of Professional Conduct 1.7(a). Ness Motley 
urges that when the Down Group offered the class a 
fair settlement in the course of the Madison County 
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class action, the interests of Interclaim directly 
conflicted with the interests of the class. The offer 
obligated Ness Motley to present the settlement to the 
class and pursue it if fair and reasonable. The conflict 
caused by the setdement talks required Ness Motley 
to withdraw its representation of Interclaim in 
furtherance of the Retainer Agreement and under the 
applicable Rules of Professional Conduct. Ness 
Motley further argues that Interclaim was not a party 
to the Madison County class action litigation; as a 
result, Ness Motley contends, hiterclaim's 
participation in settlement negotiations and proceeds 
was not required and would have been improper. 
Notably, Ness Motley has offered no authority in 
support of its argument that Interclaim's allegations 
are insufficient to state a claim for breach of fiduciary 
duty. Ness Motley's argument disputes the facts set 
out m the complaint and offers an alternative 
interpretation of the Agreement. When considering a 
motion to dismiss, however, the court must accept all 
of Interclaim's factual allegations as true and draw all 
reasonable inferences in Interclaim's favor Marks v 
CDW Computer Ctrs., 122 F.3d 363, 367 (7th 
Or. 1997), resolvmg any ambiguity in favor of 
Interclaim Dawson v. General Motors Corp., 977 
F.2d369, 372 (7th Cir. 1992). 
Under those standards, the court concludes that 
Interclaim's amended complamt adequately alleges the 
existence of a fiduciary duty between Interclaim and 
Ness Motley. Pursuant to the Retamer Agreement, 
Ness Motley was acting as "its [Interclaim's] 
counsel." Interclaim alleges that it disclosed a wealth 
of information to Ness Motley to enable the firm to 
initiate class action proceedmgs m Madison County 
(Agreement § D.) The amended complamt also alleges 
that Interclaim provided additional confidential 
information to Ness Motley m preparation for 
settlement talks with the Down Group. (Complamt f 
31.) 
The amended complamt also describes Ness Motley's 
alleged breach, as described earlier, Ness Motley 
agreed to discuss a setdement with the Down Group 
that prohibited Interclaim from participation or 
recovery. {Id. \ 30.) Further, Ness Motley 
represented a second client in die same litigation after 
unilaterally dropping Interclaim as a client and used or 
disclosed Interclaun's confidential information after it 
wididrew from representing Interclaim. {Id. 1 37 ) 
Finally, the complamt outlines Ness Motley's decision 
to dismiss a defendant from the Illinois litigation with 
prejudice, to die detnment of Interclaim. (Complaint If 
41.) 
*9 Ness Motley insists that the Rules of Professional 
Conduct required it to withdraw from representmg 
Interclaim but continue to represent die putative class. 
As the parties recogmze, the Retamer Agreement 
itself addressed the possibility of a conflict of interest. 
The relevant provision refers to a conflict of mterest 
over the amount of fees to be paid to Interclaim and 
directs that, should such a conflict arise, the class 
should obtam independent counsel to resolve the 
matter. The court notes that it is not clear tiiat this 
clause addresses the circumstances presented in Ness 
Motley's negotiations with the Down Group Even 
assuming that Down Group's settlement proposal 
created a controversy concerning the fees to be paid to 
Interclaim, this clause m the Retamer Agreement does 
not appear to require Ness Motley to sacrifice the 
interests of Interclaim. Even li Ness Motley is correct 
that the Rules of Professional Conduct required the 
firm to withdraw from representing one client m these 
circumstances, it is not cleai to the court why the 
chent who loses representation would have to be 
Interclaim 
In fact, it might be argued that the Rules of 
Professional Conduct barred Ness Motley from 
droppmg Interclaim as a chem rather than compelling 
them to do so [FN2] Pursuant to die Retamer 
Agreement, Ness Motley was m effect representmg 
two clients, the class m the action against the Down 
Group in Madison County and Interclaim in obtaining 
a judgment against the Down Group for enforcement 
in Canada When the Down Group demanded that 
Interclaim be excluded froin any settlement 
negotiations, Ness Motley could either have rejected 
that demand as adverse to die mterests of Interclaim, 
or secured Interclaun's consent before proceeding. 
Ness Motley's failure to take either such action 
arguably violates Rule 1 .7(a) m both Illinois and 
South Carolina. 
FN2 See Illinois Rule of Professional Conduct 
1 7(a) stating that "A lawyer shall not represent a 
chent if the representation of the chent will be 
drrecdy adverse to another chent, unless (1) the 
lawyer reasonably beheve[s] the representation will 
not adversely affect the relationship with the other 
chent; and (2) each client consents after disclosure", 
South Carolina Rule of Professional Conduct 1 7(a) 
(spelling out virtually identical requirement) 
Ness Modey's contmued representation of the class 
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after unilaterally withdrawing from representing 
Interclaim may also run afoul of Illinois Rule 1.9(a), 
which states that a lawyer "who has formerly 
represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter: (1) 
represent another person in the same or a substantially 
related matter in which that person's interests are 
materially adverse to the interests of the former client, 
unless the former client consents after disclosure." 
[FN3] The continuing settlement talks with the Down 
Group on behalf of Ness Motley allegedly prejudiced 
Interclaim's interests in enforcing a judgment in the 
Canadian courts, the very reason Interclaim sought 
out Ness Motley in the first place. The court 
concludes Plaintiff has alleged a claim for breach of 
fiduciary duty. 
FN3. South Carolina Rule 1.9(a) is virtually identical 
to the Illinois provision. 
Count II: Misappropriation of Confidential 
Information 
Ness Motley asserts there are no allegations to justify 
a conclusion that it revealed confidential information. 
It points to the language in the agreement that 
instructs it to "disclose confidential information 
conveyed to it by Interclaim to a court or courts in the 
United States in furtherance of the U.S. legal 
proceedings, as may be reasonably necessary." 
(Retainer Agreement § 7.0.) Ness Motley argues that 
the disclosure of the information provided to it by 
Ness Motley was precisely in furtherance of the class 
action litigation that Interclaim desired. 
*10 In ruling on the motion, the court must interpret 
the language of the Agreement in the light most 
favorable to Plaintiff. In that light, the provision cited 
by Ness Motley does not defeat Plaintiff's claim. The 
Agreement may be interpreted strictiy to require that 
the confidential information be used only in a court, 
not in settlement talks. In any event, the Agreement 
requires that Ness Motley use the information only 
while Ness Motley represented Interclaim. After Ness 
Motley terminated this relationship, it was obligated 
to discontinue any use of information it received from 
Interclaim. See generally In re Marriage of Decker, 
153 I11.2d 298, 606 N.E.2d 1094 (1993). The Illinois 
and South Carolina versions of Rule 1.9 both provide 
that a lawyer who has formerly represented a client in 
a matter shall not thereafter use information relating 
to the representation to the disadvantage of the former 
client, unless: (a) the use is permitted by Rule 1.6 or 
(b) die information lias become generally known. See 
Bobkoski v. Board of Educ. of Cory Cmty, Consol. 
Sch. Dist, No. 26, No. 90 C 5737, 1991 WL 61052, 
at *3 (N.D.I11. Apr. 12, 1991) (Kocoras, J.). 
Taking the allegations in the complaint as true, the 
information provided to Ness Motley by Interclaim 
was protected by attorney-client privilege and the rule 
of confidentiality, was secret and was only to be 
divulged in a court of law in furtherance of the class 
action litigation. The complaint also alleges that on 
information and belief, Ness Motley used this secret 
information in settlement negotiations with the Down 
Group after termination of the attorney- client 
relationship with Interclaim, thereby depriving 
Interclaim of the benefits of the assembled 
information. The court is not prepared to conclude 
that these allegations are insufficient to state a claim 
for relief. At a minimum, they support a claim of 
breach of fiduciary duty owed to Interclaim by Ness 
Motley. [FN4] 
FN4. Ness Motley's contention that a claim for 
breach of confidentiality is preempted by the Illinois 
Trade Secrets Act, 765 ILCS 1065/1 et seq., bears 
little discussion. The Act precludes common law 
actions for disclosure of manufacturing methods, 
customer lists, and the like, but no court has 
suggested that the Act eviscerates the attorney- client 
privilege. See generally Stampede Tool Warehouse, 
Inc. v. May, 111 Ill.App.3d 580, 651 N.E.2d 209 
(1st Dist. 1995). At a status hearing on this motion, 
Ness Motley's counsel expressed doubt that the 
information in question is in fact privileged. The 
court does not share that doubt; the information was 
furnished by Interclaim to its attorneys in confidence 
for the purposes of obtaining legal advice. Notably, 
the Retainer Agreement characterizes this 
information as privileged. (Agreement § 7.0.) In any 
event, the allegations support the inference that the 
information gathered by Interclaim and furnished to 
Ness Motley in confidence constituted Interclaim's 
work product. 
Count III: Breach of Retainer Agreement 
To properly plead a cause of action for breach of 
contract, a plaintiff must allege (1) the existence of a 
valid and enforceable contract; (2) performance by the 
plaintiff; (3) breach of the contract by the defendant; 
and (4) resultant injury to the plaintiff. Gonzalzles v. 
American Express Credit Corp., 315 IU.App.3d 199, 
206, 733 N.E.2d 345, 351 (1st Dist.2000). In this 
case, Interclaim alleges that Ness Motley breached the 
Retainer Agreement by unilaterally terminating its 
representation of Interclaim in the class action 
proceedings. Ness Motley urges that it was not 
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engaged to represent Interclaim in the class action but 
instead was retained to represent the class of Down 
Group victims. According to Ness Motley, 
Interclaim's agreement with certain victims authorized 
Interclaim to instruct and retain counsel and initiate 
legal proceedings designed to recover amounts owed 
to only those victims. Ness Motley argues this is 
exactly what the firm did: it filed a class action on 
behalf of class members and is attempting to secure a 
generous result in the best interests of the class. Ness 
Motley argues Interclaim's only interest in the 
Madison County litigation was to see that it proceed, 
and Ness Motley's able representation of the class 
constitutes full performance under the agreement and 
not a breach. Further, as discussed earlier, Ness 
Motley contends that applicable rules of professional 
conduct required the firm to withdraw from 
representing Interclaim when Interclaim's interests 
conflicted with the best interests of the class. 
*11 In this court's view, die language of the Retainer 
Agreement contradicts the idea that Interclaim has no 
role to play in die class action proceedings. The 
Agreement sets forth Ness Modey's commitment to 
represent Interclaim itself and the 29 class members 
as well as Ness Modey's responsibilities with respect 
to the class action litigation. Interclaim was intricately 
involved in the suit: the information Interclaim 
provided allowed Ness Modey to draft the complaint, 
obtain the TRO, and undertake setdement discussions. 
Interclaim provided critical assistance to Ness Motley 
in the litigation until Ness Motley withdrew its 
representation. Without Interclaim, Ness Modey 
would be completely unaware of die facts in this case. 
Finally, Ness Modey argues diat there are 
insufficient allegations that it breached the Retainer 
Agreement by failing to provide Interclaim's Canadian 
counsel with copies of court filings. Ness Motley 
notes that Interclaim has not adeged which documents 
were not provided nor explain how it was injured by 
the alleged breach. To survive a motion to dismiss, 
Interclaim need only set forth a short and plain 
statement for its claim for relief. Interclaim is not 
required to be specific about which filings were 
involved. Interclaim's assertion that Ness Motley's 
failure to communicate with the Canadian lawyers 
prejudiced it are adequate under this standard. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set out above, Ness Motley's motion 
to dismiss (Doc. No. 25-1) is denied. 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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